McDonnell and Anti-Corruption's Last Stand by Eisler, Jacob
    1 






In McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court constrained the reach of federal anti-
corruption law, declared the inevitability and even desirability of representatives aggrandizing 
favored constituents, and asserted patronage to be a hallmark of democracy. The unanimous 
decision is the latest and clearest indication that the Court will frustrate regulations that require 
officials to discharge their roles with disinterested neutrality.  
 
This article demonstrates the impact of the Court’s minimalist view of integrity through political 
philosophy and game theory. Given the Court’s hostility to regulatory prohibition of self-
interested political behavior, the final bulwark of public-minded governance is the electorate, 
which must use the ballot box to reject corrupt representatives. Additionally, the Court’s position 
erects significant obstacles for campaign finance progressives and advocates for institutional 
political reform. The article concludes that implementing civic anti-corruption requires either 
jurisprudential innovation or novel approaches to enforcement. 
 
This article thereby integrates the history of modern anti-corruption law with the latest leading 
decision on the topic, weaves together the Court’s blackletter doctrine with its substantive 
politics, describes the impact of the law on democratic governance, and points the way forward 
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INTRODUCTION 
The substantive regulation of politics typically provides the Supreme Court with occasion 
for fierce partisan dispute.
1
 Yet on topic of official corruption
2
 – the type of malfeasance that 
occurs when officeholders receive bribes or abuse their office for personal benefit – the Court 
has reached a consensus which has been subject of curiously little legal scholarship
3
 or popular 
attention,
4
 even though official corruption has a blatantly political character. In a series of 
holdings, the Court has demonstrated surprising tolerance for sleazy political behavior and 
consistently overturned convictions of public servants charged with abusing their offices. The 
                                                 
1 The most visible standalone instance of such partisanship may be Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For an 
analysis of the degree to which partisanship shapes judicial outcomes, see generally Michael S. Kang & Joanna 
Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1411-16 
(2016) (summarizing the literature on partisan affiliation and judicial outcomes, and observing partisan loyalty has 
an impact even where issues do not have a clear ideological bent); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the 
Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008) (finding partisan impact at the federal appellate level on the far 
more clearly partisan issue of the interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). See Section III.A.1 for a 
discussion of the partisan nature of the debate over campaign finance regulation. 
2 Except as otherwise indicated, in this article the word ‘corruption’ denotes official corruption, except where it is 
being treated comparatively (official corruption as compared to campaign finance or institutional corruption), where 
the full term is used. 
3 Dan Lowenstein and George Brown, whose works are discussed passim, have been the most dedicated scholars of 
the law of official corruption. In the legal scholarship corruption has received much greater attention in the 
campaign finance arena (perhaps corresponding to the proportion of cases). See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, On 
Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 118 (2010) (discussing the trouble of “leaders of state groveling for 
money” but focusing solely on campaign finance law). Other social science disciplines, conversely, have extensively 
explored corruption. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION 4 (1972) (offering the 
seminal modern definition of corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role…because of private-regarding…wealth or status gains”) (quoting J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political 
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967)); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, 
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT (1999) (considering corruption from economic, social, and political perspectives); 
MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION (2005) (offering a comprehensive cross-cultural typology). 
Where legal scholars give official corruption a comprehensive treatment, their analysis often evolve into treatments 
that are difficult to operationalize. See, e.g., LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY EVIL: THE IDEA OF CORRUPTION 
IN LAW 4; 248 (2013) (characterizing corruption as “capture by evil” and observing it is a “raw moral idea” with 
which law might struggle).  
4 Though it is early days for McDonnell, it might yet be an exception in terms of the attention it generates. For some 
initial thoughts on the decision and a review of the responses that have been generated in the blogosphere, see 
Matthew Stephenson, The Supreme Court’s McDonnell Opinion: A Post-Mortem, THE GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION 
BLOG, (last visited 22 July 2016) available at https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/07/19/the-supreme-courts-
mcdonnell-opinion-a-post-mortem/. 
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Court has thus revealed it expects little in terms of disinterested commitment to the public good 
from democratic representatives. 
The Court’s tolerance for self-interested representative behavior reached a high-water 
mark this past term in the unanimous decision of McDonnell v. United States.
5
 After former 
Virginia governor Bob McDonnell repeatedly advocated, in his role as governor, for the cause of 
a constituent from whom he had received $175,000 in gifts and other private benefits, he was 
convicted at a jury trial of violating federal anti-bribery statutes. After his conviction was 
affirmed by district and appellate courts,
6
 the Supreme Court overturned his conviction and 
remanded the case on the ground that the jury instruction was insufficiently precise. Doctrinally, 
the Court read the relevant statute to conclude the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury 
as to what official acts can qualify as an application of government power so as to support a 
bribery charge. Such a narrowing interpretive move is consistent with the Court’s modern 
treatment of anti-corruption law.
7
  
Substantively, the Court broke new ground by articulating its theory of representative 
governance. The Court declared that reciprocal representative-constituent relations that 
approach, but do not quite cross, the threshold of transactional sale of government action, are 
tolerable, even quotidian, political practice. Thus, while McDonnell’s conduct may have been 
“distasteful” or “tawdry” in the Court’s eyes,
8
 it was plausibly a type of condoned politicking. 
The Court supported this view by stating that the engine of democracy is biased or partial 
relationships between various actors, in particular between citizens and the representatives they 
elect.  
                                                 
5 579 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2355 (2016). This essay uses the word ‘representative’ to denote any official who is 
elected to office, rather in the narrower sense of ‘legislator’. 
6 U.S. v. McDonnell, 64 F.Supp.3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014); U.S. v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 2015). 
7 See Section I.B. 
8 136 S.Ct. at 2375. 
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McDonnell thus offers a stark declaration on democratic governance, representative 
responsibility, and how these principles shape anti-corruption jurisprudence. The ramifications of 
the Court’s substantive view of politics, as well as the Court’s long-running hostility to federal 
anti-corruption efforts, are legion: they touch on issues of federalism;
9
 of balancing defendants’ 
rights with crimes that have intrinsically slippery boundaries;
10
 and of the peculiarity of the 
Court having such a staunch commitment to defendants’ rights in a context where defendants are 
typically elite political insiders.
11
 This article, however, focuses on the political and structural 
consequences of the judicial evisceration of federal anti-corruption. To do so, it applies 
democratic and constitutional theory to contextualize the Court’s political norms, and game 
theory to demonstrate the impact of the Court’s position on the dynamic of governance.  
The article first unpacks the Court’s rejection of the claim that representatives are 
obligated to discharge their roles in a public-minded manner. The Court has explicitly declared it 
will defend the ability of officials to aggrandize constituents towards whom they feel affection or 
gratitude. This position commits to a vision of politics as reciprocal power relationships between 
representatives and the citizens who support them, with government disproportionally favoring 
constituents who have ingratiated themselves with political leaders. This approach is championed 
in the social sciences by agonist treatment of democracy, which characterizes political life as 
conflict between actors to achieve instrumental control of government decision-making and 
                                                 
9 See Section III.B.2 for an analysis of the tense relationship between federal anti-corruption efforts and autonomy 
of local governance. 
10 See infra note 18. 
11 The late Justice Scalia led an attack on the slipperiness of anti-corruption crimes. See, e.g., Sorich v. U.S., 555 
U.S. 1204, 129 S.Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that 18 U.S.C. §1346, 
the federal honest services statute which was, inter alia, used to prosecute McDonnell, “invites abuse by headline-
grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of 
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.”). Concerns such as these are discussed in, e.g., HARVEY 
SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT 3 (2009). 
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resource allocation.
12
 McDonnell reveals that the Court is committed to such a conception of 
agonist politics (at least in the anti-corruption domain). The opinion further demonstrates that the 
Court holds an especially minimalist view of the rules of political competition. It thus tolerates 
self-interested and reciprocal conduct except where it is so egregious that it becomes bribery akin 
to theft from the public. The substantive theory of McDonnell indicates that the series of 
holdings unfavorable for federal anti-corruption efforts is a function of the Court’s political 
ideology, rather than incidental to its application of blackletter doctrine. This observation unifies 
the Court’s long-established official anti-corruption doctrine and the Court’s novel articulation of 
its view of representation in McDonnell. 
The Court’s commitment to agonism challenges alternative theories that assert 
representatives have a firm obligation to serve the collective public interest. Such public-minded 
theories – which have various permutations in law and social science,
13
 but which this article 
                                                 
12 Classic tracts arguing for agonist understandings of democracy include JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1987) (“the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote”); ROBERT DAHL, PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY  67-71 (2006) (defining democracy as a 
competitive preference-realizing infrastructure); and IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 51 (2003). 
Dahl is arguably the most prominent champion of interest group pluralism in American democracy, whereas 
Schumpeter and Shapiro offer more generic conceptions of democracy through agonism, though Schumpeter offers 
a more cynical theory of elite control of the process and Shapiro a more hopeful assessment of agonism as the basis 
of genuinely equal democracy. There are fewer staunch advocates for the agonist approach in legal scholarship. See, 
e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111 (1995) 
(critiquing the “moralist/idealist” approach to politics for betraying the realities of political competition). More 
typical is the approach exemplified by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998), operating on the assumption that a goal of 
electoral design should be to ensure adequate competition. Likewise, some treatments of the First Amendment 
presume the goal of speech rights in the realm of politics is to allow unfettered citizen access to information, thus 
resulting in competition for voter approval. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 177 (2010) (concluding that the libertarian treatment of free speech presmied on “the more 
speech the better” may be a “congenial vision”). 
13 Perhaps the most prominent modern advocacy for such a civic understanding in law is civic republicanism, 
seminally championed by Frank Michelman in Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1495 (1988) 
(“republicanism…enhances everyone’s political freedom…It involves the ongoing revision of the normative 
histories that make political communities sources of contestable value and self-direction for their members”), Cass 
Sunstein in Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1541 (1988) (identifying deliberation, equality, 
citizenship, and universalism “exemplified by the notion of a common good” as the characteristics of civic 
republicanism), and RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 233 (2000) (the “fusion of political morality and 
critical self-interest seems to me to be the true nerve of civic republicanism, the important way in which individual 
6 
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collectively denotes as ‘civic’ – conceive of governance as a shared enterprise between the entire 
polity; hold that appropriate rule serves collective welfare rather than the interests of discrete 
constituents or coalitions; and suggest that representatives should orient their conduct towards 
the benefit of the entire public rather than propitiating themselves or their favored constituents. 
Civic approaches thus prize cooperation over conflict and substantive neutrality over patronage 
or favoritism. While the Court has not explicitly condemned a civic approach, the article shows 
that the dynamics of governance produced by the Court’s holdings impair realization of a civic 
politics.  
This judicial hostility to civic-minded anti-corruption has one universal political 
consequence: it throws the onus of advancing civic integrity upon the electorate, which remains 
the sole instrument for denying office to self-aggrandizing representatives. Yet there are 
tremendous challenges to advancing a civic-minded approach to politics through the electoral 
system alone. A system that lacks internal mechanisms for ensuring disinterested conduct will be 
systemically unstable,
14
 as it has no apparatus for encouraging cooperation directed towards the 
mutual good, and thus participants in the political system have an incentive to ‘defect’ and 
exploit politics to maximize their own resource extraction. Moreover, the increasingly fractious 
                                                                                                                                                             
citizens should merge their interests and personality into a political community”). For a critique of civic 
republicanism, including an observation (that there is a tension between collectivist foundations of civic republicans 
and protection of individual civil liberties) that may explain the liberal justices’ odd silence in the official corruption 
jurisprudence, see Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 803 
(1993). The more recent and oblique expression of this civic impulse in the legal academy may be the institutional 
corruption reformers, discussed in Section III.A.2 infra. In the social sciences, prominent advocates of civic 
approaches to politics include AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT 4 (2004) 
(justifiability through reason-giving to other members of communities is “meant both to produce a justifiable 
decision and to express the value of mutual respect”); PHILIP PETIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT 110 (2002) (republicanism as non-domination draws together the ideals of egalitarianism and 
communitarianism); G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (2008) (arguing that the ability of members of 
a polity to provide reasons cognizable to one another in the context of common institutions is necessary to maintain 
“ties of civic friendship”) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 536 (1980)). 
14 See Sections II.B & C on how unregulated agonism excludes civic governance. 
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and divided character of the electorate in modern liberal democracies suggests that it may be 
difficult to achieve the unity necessary to advance civic-minded governance through elections. 
The judicial treatment of anti-corruption and its view of democracy revealed therein also 
have significant implications for attempts to reform related domains of law. Firstly, while a civic 
view of corruption in the campaign finance domain has its apparent champions on the Court,
15
 
the unanimity of McDonnell suggests there may be obstacles to formulating a satisfactory 
progressive theory of political integrity. While the doctrinal questions may differ, the shared 
issue of representative obligation means a failure to reconcile the treatment of governance 
between campaign finance law and official corruption law will inevitably create tensions. The 
unanimity of the bench regarding official corruption further suggests that advocates for more 
responsive, public-regarding governance such as Lawrence Lessig and Zephyr Teachout may 
face a stalwart foe in the Court. 
The article concludes by considering both jurisprudential and policy innovations that 
could facilitate civic anti-corruption. Reinterpreting the doctrinal context of the official 
corruption jurisprudence to reflect the allocation of power between citizens and officials could 
reconcile the bench with civic anti-corruption. An immediate policy solution to enable civic anti-
corruption enforcement is state-led enforcement with federal cooperation, which would address 
federalism concerns and distance such prosecutions from federal judicial review.  
                                                 
15 On the bench, Justice Breyer may have dedicated the greatest energy to advancing such a position. See, e.g., 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1468 (2014) (Breyer, dissenting) (arguing that active campaign 
finance regulation can strengthen rather than weaken the First Amendment, but observing such positive and 
traditional negative mandates will remain in tension); see also Stephen G. Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 
NYU L. REV. 245 (2002) (articulating the grounds for a participatory view of democracy that will provide positive 
support for the First Amendment). Yet Breyer was also necessarily part of the McDonnell consensus. 
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I. MCDONNELL AND ANTI-CORRUPTION DOCTRINE 
The law of corruption delineates appropriate boundaries when discharging the duties of 
public office. Among the opinions that address substantive federal corruption doctrine, 
McDonnell uniquely enumerates an explicit theory of representative conduct. This Section first 
provides background on the jurisprudence of official corruption, contextualizes McDonnell, and 
then unpacks the novel theory of representation set forth in the opinion. 
A. Official Corruption and Public Office 
The law of corruption identifies when public officials betray their office for the sake of 
self-enrichment.
16
 Though the ontology of corruption has been the subject of contentious 
academic debate, certain general features are uncontroversial. In generic terms, corruption refers 
to misuse of public office (including, potentially, citizenship)
17
 motivated by some desire for 
private gain by the misuser.  Corruption is thus intimately related to positive duties of 
government. Corruption can be understood as deviation from political integrity (itself informed 
by deep concepts such as sovereign legitimacy and the right to use the collective power of the 
state), and a particular corrupt act can be understood as the violation of a political duty.
18
  
                                                 
16 Such a definition has its archetypal expression in Nye, supra note 3.  
17 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by 
Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455 (1994). 
18 Ultimately the question of when conduct is substantively corrupt comes devolves upon questions of legitimacy of 
reason-giving, which itself depends upon norms of the polity, and it is unclear if law can exhaust this question. See, 
e.g., Mark Philp, Conceptualizing Political Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 46 
(Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2002) (observing that rules cannot capture the sense of 
inappropriateness of behavior that underlies that underlies an accusation of corruption); Daniel H. Lowenstein, 
Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 786-788 (1985) (observing that 
corruption traces back to a theoretical question of legitimacy, but in as an intermediary entity is not sharply 
delineated in practice). Given that the boundary of corruption is inevitably interwoven with a polity’s ‘deep’ norms, 
it may be there is a virtue to anti-corruption laws which have a level of indeterminacy, insofar as that indeterminacy 
will induce reflection upon such norms. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On 
the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010). 
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In legal enforcement, corrupt acts are often characterized as quid pro quo bribery,
19
 
wherein the public official trades power of her office in exchange for private enrichment. When a 
government official selects a defense contractor for a state project, or decides whether or not to 
pursue a prosecution based not on the appropriate considerations of public duty, but in exchange 
for an envelope full of cash from a private party, he engages in classic quid pro quo. Classic quid 
pro quo can be understood as a procedural failure that displaces norms of service with 
unrestricted market logic: the appropriate reasoning process that should guide use of public 
power is replaced by a covert ‘black market’ wherein public service is traded for the private 
benefit that accrues to the official.
20
 Classic quid pro quo can also be understood as a type of 
sophisticated theft.
21
 When a public official has been entrusted with power to use in accordance 
with the duties of office (the delineation of such duties determining when behavior is corrupt), 
and illicitly trades this power for private gain, it has the same effect as theft from the public. 
Quid pro quo neither exhausts nor fully informs the conceptualization of corrupt conduct; 
a public official who, knowing (or, more invidiously yet, having decided) that the government 
                                                 
19 Though the law on official corruption is not especially consolidated, see Peter Henning, Public Corruption: A 
Comparative Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 793, 798-99 (2001) (federal anti-corruption law is a “hodgepodge”), federal anti-corruption statutes now generally 
operate in a quid pro quo mold. Core statutes include 18 U.S.C. §201 (criminalizing bribery and illegal receipt of 
gratuities); 18 U.S.C. §666 (criminalizing bribery involving federal funds); 18 U.S.C. §1951 (the Hobbs Act, 
criminalizing extortion in interstate commerce); and 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346 (the federal honest services statute, 
post-Skilling, now limited to an anti-bribery measures). These statutes are discussed as they present in the case law 
infra. Interestingly enough, the idea that corruption is only quid pro quo bribery has had no more stalwart advocate 
than Justice Kennedy, who has aggressively championed quid pro quo as the sine qua non of corruption in the 
campaign finance context, and firmly argued this is the legacy of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357-59 (2010). This approach, however, has resulted in a number of tensions within 
campaign finance doctrine. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (2011); Jacob Eisler, Judicial Perceptions of Electoral Psychology and the Deep Patterns of 
Campaign Finance Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. __ (2016) (observing the puzzles remaining in the doctrine and their role 
in the partisan dispute). 
20 For a description and critique of such market-oriented views of corruption, see Philp, supra note 18, at 49; for a 
more extended game-theoretical analysis of corruption as a type of market, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, When is 
Corruption Harmful?, in Heidenheimer & Johnston, supra note 18, at 357. For a descriptive analysis of how 
corruption interacts with market structures, see Benjamin A. Olken and Patrick Barron, The Simple Economics of 
Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh, 117 J. POL. EC. 417 (2009). 
21 John Gardiner, Defining Corruption, in Heidenheimer & Johnston, supra note 18, at 28 differentiates theft from 
corruption in that corruption must have the additional elements of deception and misuse of public resources. 
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will make use of a publicly traded company’s services and thus that the company’s stock will 
rise in value, trades his private wealth on the knowledge of that transaction, arguably misuses the 
privileges of office through corrupt self-dealing.
22
 However, even where quid pro quo is taken as 
the seminal form of corruption, significant conceptual challenges remain. Each element of quid 
pro quo – the quid the public official receives, the quo he performs for the private party, and the 
pro connecting them – can be variously parsed, producing shifting levels of obligation.
23
 An 
envelope of cash surreptitiously given almost certainly qualifies as a quid; but what of a 
favorable reference given to an official’s relative, or more vaguely yet, a promise that an official 
will be seen ‘gratefully’ in his future dealings with the private party (perhaps culminating in a 
post after the official has left public service)? When a representative receives a payoff and then 
issues an order directly expending massive state resources, it will almost certainly count as a 
quo, but what of discussions with other governmental officials that speak favorably of the private 
party,
24
 or even an intangible sense of gratitude that results in an imperceptible thumb on the 
scale of political decision-making that benefits the private party? Manipulating the breadth of the 
relevant terms can operationalize quid pro quo to fit vastly diverse expectations of public duty. 
For example, particularly expansive expectations of duty may expand the definition of a quid so 
as to criminalize any receipt of gifts by a public figure, even in the absence of a corresponding 
public act; conversely such a broad concept of duty may also prohibit public decisions that seem 
inexplicably favorable to a private party (ie, a quo may be illicit even where there is no quid). 
Conversely a narrow conception of duty may identify quid pro quo only where each of the bribe, 
                                                 
22 However, the Court has recently pruned penalization of this facet of corruption. See discussion of Skilling infra. 
23 Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 796-97, offers a detailed parsing of these questions. George Brown, The Gratuities 
Debate and Campaign Reform: How Strong is the Link?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1375-76 (2007), observes the 
manner in which one of the core anti-corruption statutes (and the one used to define the crime of corruption in 
McDonnell), 18 U.S.C. § 201, sets forth distinct crimes of bribery in subsection (b) and illegal receipt of gratuities in 
subsection (c), but that the doctrinal relationship between them appears unclear, though it seems as though the 
gratuity offenses has a less demanding pro component to support the offense. 
24 McDonnell’s key holding is that such conduct does not qualify as a quo. 
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the payoff, and the causal connection between them is distinctly present and inexplicable except 
as part of an exchange.  
The breadth of quid pro quo and its relationships to other obligations dictated by public 
office is the subject of extensive scholarly and jurisprudential analysis and ultimately devolves 
upon public expectations for reason-giving and justifiability.
25
 One complication is that deficits 
of public integrity in a political system may not necessarily be easily correlated with particular 
acts, or even failures of particular public office. In the campaign finance domain, a major 
concern of anti-corruption activists is the ability of private actors to influence elections, and 
thereby induce public officials to take account of private interests, even where none of the 
elements of quid pro quo are apparent.
26
 Campaign finance corruption blurs into what has been 
termed ‘institutional’ corruption by Dennis Thompson.
27
 Institutional corruption occurs where 
the duties of public offices are abused not for explicitly private gain, but in order to yield 
political benefit (which does not accrue to the official’s personal welfare). The line between 
politics-as-usual and institutional corruption can be difficult to define, and, typically even more 
so than classically public-private quid pro quo corruption, shifts with reference to institutional 
norms. Practices such as pork barrel spending and logrolling may either be deemed a failure to 
                                                 
25 See supra note 18. Ackerman, supra note 3, provides a unified structural description of the relationship between 
democratic structures and the tendency towards corruption, and observes how campaign finance as a mechanism for 
exchanging political power can create an ambiguous bridge between patronage as part of democratic practice and 
corruption. 
26 See supra note 19; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 450 (Stevens, dissenting) (arguing that rich donors have the 
excessive ability to influence political outcomes given the current state of campaign finance regulation). Some 
scholars have offered arguments that distinguish campaign finance corruption from official corruption on the 
grounds that the quid of campaign finance is purely political, the sole impact is in the electoral realm and ultimately 
upon voters, and thus it cannot be analogized in terms of its privately aggrandizing effect to classic official 
corruption. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 
1373 (1994); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 903 
(1998). The ability of campaign finance money to corrupt political life despite this difference drives some 
typologies, see Johnston, supra note 3, as well as institutional corruption scholars, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
REPUBLIC, LOST 92 (2011). 
27 DENNIS THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS (1995) provides the seminal statement. Thompson’s basic point, id. at 8, 
might be that the complexities of legislative action create opportunities for misuse of public office more complex 
(both structurally and morally) than mere bribery.  
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appropriately discharge commitment to the public good, or as an acceptable, even (where it 
advances the causes of constituents) commendable, expression of political realities;
28
 yet such 
political behavior may have the traits of quid pro quo, with the sole differences being 
representatives trade political favors rather than trading public power for private gain. The 
judgment of if such practices are illicit ultimately depends upon normative assertions regarding 
the political process as a whole as well as the duties of public office.
29
 
 By taking as its subject the law on ‘official corruption,’ this article targets a lineage of 
Supreme Court opinions on federal statutes that prohibit trades of public decision-making for 
private gain. This domain of law does not take as a core question if purely political exchanges 
are tolerable, nor does it generally inquire into institutional dynamics. The immediate question 
raised by these cases, rather, is if particular acts that involves public-private exchanges fulfill the 
(typically) quid pro quo formula of anti-corruption statutes. Official corruption law has not 
evolved into the vibrant forum for debating the appropriate nature of democratic governance as 
has the campaign finance jurisprudence.
30
 Rather (at least until McDonnell) it has retained a 
                                                 
28 Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 846, observes that the “tendency of logrolling and state-bribery to serve parochial 
interests has caused considerable scorn to be placed on these practices. Nevertheless, it generally is recognized that 
these practices may lend some flexibility to the overall political system, and for better or worse, they are tolerated.” 
Some have gone so far as to argue that such practices like at the heart of effective democracy, and thereby challenge 
civic critiques of such an approach. See JONATHAN RAUCH, POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS, MACHINES, BIG 
MONEY, AND BACK-ROOM DEALS CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2015). 
29 Of course, the line between institutional and private corruption may blur as well. One prominent real-world form 
that scholars have identified is the ‘revolving door’ nature of K Street; when Congresspeople wish to monetize their 
public service, they leave office and assume high-paying jobs where they serve the interests of their (well-heeled) 
former constituents. See Lessig, supra note 26, at 123. Because such positions occur after leaving office, they may 
not be connected to a particular public act; and because they comprise an entire form of employment it is awkward 
to characterize them as a traditional quid. Yet is difficult to deny that such practice results in the over-representation 
of special interests who are capable of offering ‘compensation’ through such positions. Yet, given the current quid 
pro quo oriented nature of contemporary treatments of corruption, stigmatizing, let alone prohibiting, such behavior 
may be difficult. 
30 For some of the exceptions, see generally Brown, supra note 23, at 1399-1400 (observing both the similarities and 
distinctions between the two areas of law); George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: 
With a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 N.D. L. Rev. 177, 182-183 (2016) 
(observing the bifurcation between the two zones of law, and the need to unify them); Daniel Lowenstein, When is a 
Campaign Contribution a Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig 
eds., 2004) (enquiring as to how campaign finance and official corruption law intersect at a technical level).  
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narrow blackletter emphasis on if specific instances of public malfeasance fulfill each element of 
the classic quid pro quo formula,
31
 and if types of self-interested conduct other than bribery are 
likewise illicit.
32
 However, as this Section has demonstrated, even where the type of corrupt 
conduct is limited to quid pro quo, there remains an enormous amount of indeterminacy in the 
functional boundaries of corruption, as the norms that define where conduct becomes illicit can 
be so diversely construed. The more expansively the various elements of quid pro quo are 
interpreted, the greater the array of prohibited conduct, and the stronger the onus on public 
officials to consider the public good. If the law is coherent, such specific considerations should 
have a knock-on effect on corruption in broader institutional settings (such as campaign finance), 
as Section III.A describes. 
McDonnell’s weight comes from its implications for this relationship between anti-
corruption law and the level of public-mindedness expected of officials. More demanding 
expectations in terms of public integrity will obligate officials to act in the general interests of 
polity and disregard their own interest as well as the interests of particular constituents, resulting 
in procedural neutrality with regards to use of political power.  By narrowing the breadth of a 
central concept in the corruption formula (the quo element of official conduct), and arguing that 
this narrowness springs from the very nature of democratic representation, the Court stakes out a 
minimalist position on the expectations for public integrity, and reduces the breadth of 
representative behavior identified as corrupt.  
                                                 
31 This was the subject of Sun-Diamond, Evans, and McCormick. 
32 This has been the subject of the honest services jurisprudence addressed in McNally and Skilling. 
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B. The Doctrinal Pruning of Anti-Corruption 
As a doctrinal holding, McDonnell is merely the predictable culmination of the Court’s 
blackletter treatment of corruption.
33
 With one modern exception
34
 in the official corruption 
context, the Court’s substantive interpretation of anti-corruption statutes by public figures has 
favored defendants.
35
 This exacting treatment of corruption prosecutions has operated through 
interpretive mechanisms, specifically canons of statutory interpretation and review of criminal 
procedure,
36
 particularly jury instructions. The Court has thus adopted a demanding posture 
towards the drafting of anti-corruption legislation and the actual prosecution of corrupt officials.  
                                                 
33 The Court’s persistent attitude towards corruption can be understood as a reaction to longitudinal political 
circumstances, George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us - Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and Two Views of the 
Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747 (2000), or as reflective of perhaps deeper normative commitments of the 
judiciary, Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle over Anti-Corruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, 
and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2011). 
34 In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), a Court, split along typical partisan lines, affirmed a Hobbs Act 
conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (prohibiting extortion, the flip side of bribery and often seen as an analogous crime, 
see James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1695 (1993)), could be satisfied without ‘active’ acceptance where an official ‘passively’ accepted a quid pro quo. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, id. at 274, seems to reflect the functional rationale – the offense of bribery could be 
‘winked’ and ‘nodded’ out of existence if bribes needed to be accepted by something akin to a contract.  The case, 
however, has caused some jurisprudential confusion, particularly as it came on the heels of another Hobbs Act case, 
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), which echoed McDonnell in overturning a conviction for a jury 
instruction failure on very similar facts to Evans. Ultimately scholars seem puzzled by the coexistence of the two 
cases. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 130. Brown, supra note 30, at 207-8; 216-21, observes Evans is a ‘difficult’ 
and ‘remarkable’ case, while perspicaciously observing that lower federal courts have adopted Evans as a standard 
and distinguished McCormick and Sun-Diamond for official corruption prosecutions. However, McDonnell seems to 
reaffirm the status of Evans as an outlier at the Supreme Court level, and perhaps suggests a divergence between 
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. Thus Brown’s striking observation can perhaps be traced to the fact that 
lower appellate courts have a more granular and immediate sense of local politics, whereas the Supreme Court, 
insulated from local politics, is able to maintain the abstract, idealized view of politics. 
35 ‘Substantive interpretation’ here is differentiated from, e.g., questions of jurisdiction and standing that do not bear 
on the actual definition of when conduct is corrupt. Cf. George Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecutions of 
State and Local Officials after Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2005) (arguing that Sabri v. United States, 
541 U.S. 600 (2004) reveals the Court’s intention to permit broad federal enforcement of anti-corruption). However, 
cases such as Sabri do not go to the nature of corruption or expectations of public integrity, just the reach of federal 
power, and the lineage of cases discussed in this article demonstrate that the Court has developed a very constrained 
notion of the substance of corruption. While there may be unspoken interactions between federalism concerns and 
corruption prosecutions, had the Court wished to exonerate McDonnell on explicit terms of federalism, it could have 
done so. 
36 It is an interesting question – though one beyond the ken of this essay – why the Court has shown rising lenience 
in the procedural domain to corrupt politicians, even as it has deconstructed the robustness of criminal procedure 
protections in other contexts, such as the 4th Amendment. See, e.g., Utah v Stieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 
2061 (2016) (further weakening the doctrine that prevents use of “fruit of the poisonous tree” from unconstitutional 
searches and seizures). 
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The Court’s treatment of official corruption narrowed the range of political behavior 
classified as illicit, though the individual holdings each has doctrinal foundations that do not 
directly invoke the substance of corruption. McDonnell itself is a seminal example. McDonnell 
had accepted $175,000 in personal gifts and benefits from a private constituent who owned a 
nutritional supplement company.
37
 In exchange, McDonnell had undertaken certain conduct, 
such as encouraging his subordinates to meet with representatives of the company and 
advocating for policies that would propitiate the company; at times these acts occurred within 
minutes of receiving emolument from the patron constituent.
38
 McDonnell was in effect acting as 
an undisclosed ‘insider’ lobbyist for the company. After a federal investigation and prosecution, 
McDonnell was convicted at a jury trial of violating two federal anti-bribery statutes (honest 
services fraud and the Hobbs Act) and related offenses,
39
 but the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded his conviction because the jury instruction did not define what comprised a corrupt 
‘act’ (the quo component of a quid pro quo formula) with the narrow clarity necessary to support 
a bribery conviction. 
The blackletter reasoning of McDonnell applied statutory interpretation to review of jury 
instructions. Relying on the “familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis,”
40
 the Court parsed the 
federal anti-bribery statute 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3)
41
 to conclude that a “formal exercise of 
                                                 
37 136 S. Ct. at 2361. 
38 Id. at 2364. 
39 Id. at 2366. 
40 The Court deemed that because the words “question” and “matter” were adjacent to the words “cause, suit, 
proceeding, and controversy”, for the latter four words to retain meaning, “question” and “matter” needed to be 
interpreted narrowly. Id. at 2368-69. 
41 The statute, 18 U.S.C. §201(b) states, in relevant part “being a public official or person selected to be a public 
official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of 
value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; 
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make 
opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or 
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person…”  
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government power”
42
 is necessary to qualify as the quo in an illicit quid pro quo exchange. It 
thus deemed the jury instruction deficient as it “did not adequately explain how to identify a 
‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’” and thereby failed to properly guide 
the jury’s assessment of if McDonnell had offered formal use of government power as his quo in 
exchange for the private benefits.
43
 The Court rejected the argument that the jury argument was 
harmless,
44
 implying it is at least plausible that the jury, if properly instructed, would have 
deemed McDonnell’s conduct to be licit. 
As described in Section I.C, the McDonnell Court surpasses the narrow statutory and 
procedural findings necessary to remand the case and offers a full-fledged theory of 
representative accountability, the first time the Court has so articulated its view in the official 
corruption context. Doctrinally, however, the holding is the latest in a series in which the 
Supreme Court has hobbled anti-corruption legislation and prosecution. In the latest prior case 
that impacted the substantive contours of federal anti-corruption law, Skilling v. United States,
45
 
the Court engaged in an extensive reading of legal history to determine that the federal honest 
services doctrine prohibits only bribes and kickbacks, but does not prohibit undisclosed self-
dealing. The court thus constricted the intangible right to honest services – revived after McNally 
v. U.S.
46
 by 18 U.S.C. §1346 through explicit statutory invocation of the pre-McNally case law
47
 
– to bribery-like conduct. The opinion relied on the principle that where there is uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall be found guilty of bribery. The statute, 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3), further defines “official act” to mean “any 
decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be 
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such 
official's place of trust or profit.” See supra note 23 for scholarly technical dissections of the bribery offense. 
42 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
43 Id. at 2374. 
44 Id. at 2375. 
45 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
46 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (relying on the rule of lenity to strike down the doctrine of the intangible right to honest 
services that had evolved in federal Courts, and become a potent anti-corruption weapon for federal prosecutors). 
47 §1346 comprised the explicit rejection of the Court’s holding in McNally, thus comprising the classic form of 
legislative response to a disfavored judicial ruling; Congress took seriously the Court’s invitation to “speak more 
clearly”.  
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surrounding a statute’s meaning, it should be subject to “limiting construction”,
48
 and deemed 
that the case law prior to McNally only clearly prohibited bribery, but no other misuse of public 
office. The effect was to turn §1346 into a simple anti-bribery statute, even though §1346 had 
become an (admittedly controversial)
49
 tool for prosecuting a wider array of behavior that 
exploited public office.
50
 Skilling, as did McDonnell, thus relied upon procedural concerns and 
the interpretive canon to limit the reach of conduct touched by anti-corruption law.
51
 
A similar relationship between legal reasoning and corruption is apparent in the 
unanimous decision United States v. Sun-Diamond, the case that most directly prefigures 
McDonnell.
52
 As did McDonnell, Sun-Diamond enquired into the level of precision dictated by a 
federal anti-corruption statute,
53
 and how such breadth impacts jury instructions. The Court 
deemed there to be material error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury that an emolument 
might be given to a public official on account of his position, rather than in relation to a specific 
public act performed by the official. Again, the doctrinal tool employed by the Court is that of 
statutory interpretation – underlying the differentiation between ‘positions’ and ‘acts’ is the 
interpretative principle that a statute which criminalizes conduct in a domain of extensive 
                                                 
48 A concurring minority of the Court would have struck down §1346 altogether as impermissibly vague, rather than 
tried to inappropriately rescue it via a limiting construction. 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, concurring in part). 
49 Prior to its nullification by McNally, the honest services doctrine enabled by 18 U.S.C. §1341 had been described 
as prosecutors’ “true love” for its breadth, power, and flexibility. Jed Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 
I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980); see also Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 251, 
251 (2010) (citing Rakoff’s description and discussing the complexities regarding federal-state relationships and 
normative question raised thereby). 
50 While Supreme Court conceded that the federal appellate courts had variously identified conduct beyond bribes 
and kickbacks as illicit under §1346 (for example, “schemes of non-disclosure and concealment of material 
information,” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted)), the Court determined that lenity and due process 
mandated that the lack of clarity surrounding the identification of such conduct excluded them from the ambit of 
§1346. 
51 The Court thus reveals a preference to only permit prosecution of conduct that falls into the “black” area of the 
“bribery core” rather than permit possible consideration of “grey” areas of arguably improper conduct. Lowenstein, 
supra note 18, at 786. 
52 526 U.S. 398 (1999). The facts of the case are in some respects similar to McDonnell, though the dollar value of 
the goods received is significantly lower. 
53 In Sun-Diamond, at issue was the anti-gratuity statute 18 U.S.C. §201(c)(1)(A). 
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regulation ought to be read narrowly and treated as a “scalpel” rather than a “meat axe”.
54
 Yet 
the opinion has the same effect on substantive anti-corruption legislation as McDonnell and 
Skilling – restricting prosecution of officials for conduct that might sacrifice public good for 
private gain.  
This pattern has earlier antecedents in modern official corruption jurisprudence.
55
 The 
Court consistently sets forth judgments that narrow the scope of anti-corruption legislation and 
raises standard for corruption prosecutions. This imposes a high bar upon the legislature in 
drafting anti-corruption legislation and upon prosecutors when bringing anti-corruption suits. 
The Court thus expects both the legislature and the executive to implement anti-corruption with 
scrupulous exactitude, and seems unwilling to accommodate either a legislative intent to sweep 
broadly with anti-corruption legislation (a particularly confounding move given the seemingly 
intentionally broad drafting of §1346),
56
 or permit prosecutors leeway in the application of such 
legislation. By interdicting and complicating penalization of self-interested behavior, the Court 
reduces incentives for officials to behave in a public-minded manner, promotes an agonist 
political dynamic, and impairs opportunities for civic governance. 
While it can be argued that this pattern present in the official corruption case law is a 
byproduct of the consistent application of unrelated and politically neutral doctrine, the contrast 
with the treatment of corruption in two other domains suggests the Court has treated official anti-
corruption law especially stringently. Comparison to campaign finance corruption reveals a 
different tune. In the foundational campaign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Court went so far 
                                                 
54 526 U.S. at 412. Paradoxically, in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 267 (2003), Scalia challenges prophylactic 
campaign finance regulation by advocating for “broadly drawn bribery law…[that] would, in all likelihood, 
eliminate any appearance of corruption in the system”.  
55 See the discussion of McCormick in supra note 34. See also McNally. See generally Eisler, supra note 33 
(describing the longitudinal pattern of the Court preferring a narrow conception of corruption); cf. Brown, supra 
note 30 (analyzing and critiquing Eisler’s argument, and suggesting that the narrow view of corruption may only 
apply in the campaign finance context). 
56 Eisler, supra note 33, at 419 n.172. 
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as to innovate an idea of corruption that could balance First Amendment rights.
57
 The extent and 
interpretation of campaign finance corruption has been the source of bitter partisan dispute 
(unlike official corruption, which has produced little internal dispute on the bench).
58
 Strikingly, 
some justices have offered a far more vibrantly wide-ranging theory of campaign finance 
corruption than they have countenanced in the official corruption context, a paradox discussed in 
greater detail in Section III.A.1. Likewise telling is the Court’s distinctly less lenient treatment of 
undue private influence upon judges. In two recent cases,
59
 the Court has indicated that judges 
must carefully avoid either the appearance or reality of making decisions in light of undue 
influence, and has contrasted the judicial role with the role of representatives.
60
  
C. McDonnell’s Minimalist Theory of Representative Integrity 
The prospective explanations for the Supreme Court’s long-running disapprobation of 
civic anti-corruption are legion: the Court’s mandate to protect individual procedural rights may 
conflict with the prioritization of the public good that underlies civic anti-corruption;
61
 strong 
personalities on the bench may hold a minimalist concept of corruption,
62
 and (unlike in the 
                                                 
57 424 U.S. at 26-27. Issacharoff, supra note 3 at 119, has characterized the campaign finance regime springing from 
Buckley as “in fact a regulatory structure created by the Court.” 
58 See generally Kang and Shepherd, supra note 1; Eisler, supra note 19. Breyer’s own confused remarks during the 
McDonnell transcript reveal the disjunction between the campaign finance and official corruption jurisprudence. See 
Transcript of Record at 47, McDonnell (No. 15-474). 
59 Caperton v. Massey, 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
60 Williams-Yulee, 135 S.Ct. at 1674 (Ginsburg, concurring). The Court’s perception of the distinction between 
judges and other public servants runs deep. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. at 267, 278 (2004) (“Laws 
promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must 
be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”). 
61 Cf. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409 (observing that if the right to honest services vivified by were deemed to include “a 
wider range of offensive conduct [the statute] would raise due process concerns underlying the vagueness 
doctrine.”), with, e.g., Philp, supra note 18 and Underkuffler, supra note 3. It is precisely the challenge of 
successfully identifying corrupt conduct in a manner adaptable to the adaptive and deceitful nature of corruption 
while also satisfying due process concerns that generates such a tension. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud 
and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 156 (1994) (“The 
perplexing problem is whether political corruption can be prevented and punished without denigrating constitutional 
protections and individual civil rights. A Hobson's choice is seen to exist between enacting a specific statute that 
may be circumvented or a vague statute that is subject to selective enforcement”). 
62 It is perhaps worth nothing that while Sun-Diamond and McDonnell were unanimous decisions, they were penned 
by Scalia and Roberts respectively. 
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campaign finance context) other members of the Court may have little interest in pushing back; 
the role differentiation between judges and representatives apparent in Caperton and Williams-
Yulee may incline judges (aware of their own distinct obligations) to treat representatives with 
lenience. Yet McDonnell goes beyond merely articulating the doctrinal rationale for its 
circumscribed view of corruption, and delineates the Court’s theory of representative service. By 
illuminating the Court’s view of politics, McDonnell suggests that judicial hostility towards civic 
anti-corruption is an expression of the Court’s substantive commitments rather than merely an 
incidental by-product of neutral application of doctrinal principles. The Court has a view of 
politics sympathetic to reciprocal, patronage-driven representative-constituent relations and thus 
hostile to a civic anti-corruption, and these substantive views shape the Court’s holdings. The 
doctrinal basis (statutory interpretation and procedural concerns), of course, may independently 
tend to impair civic anti-corruption, but the Court has a bias for applying these tools in manner 
that advances its agonist view. 
The Court’s substantive theory of acceptable political conduct is set forth most explicitly 
in section II(B) of the opinion, where the Court observes that  
conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their 
behalf, and include them in events all the time. The basic compact underlying representative 
government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately 
on their concerns…The Government’s position could cast a pall of potential prosecution over 
these relationships…Officials might wonder whether they could respond to even the most 
commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink from 
participating in democratic discourse.63 
 
The innocuous tone of the assertion is belied by its practical bite: the Court deemed that 
McDonnell’s conduct – accepting nearly two hundred thousand dollars in various benefits from 
an interested constituent, and reciprocating with favorable action – to be plausibly acceptable (in 
understated language, the Court laconically observes that it may not “typify normal political 
                                                 
63 McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2355. 
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interaction between public officials and their constituents”
64
). While couched in the doctrinal 
holding that the trial court did not properly guide jurors in assessing if McDonnell’s undertakings 
in exchange for these quids were “official acts”, the substantive implication is striking: it is at 
least possible that McDonnell’s conduct was sufficiently permissible (even if incontrovertibly 
“tawdry”)
65
 that with proper instruction a jury might have reached a different conclusion. More 
succinctly stated, the Court sees it as at least feasible that McDonnell’s conduct was an instance 
of acceptable political practice. 
 The Court’s view determines the outer boundaries of quid pro quo bribery. As described 
in Section I.A, the quid pro quo form of corruption does not have default breadth: its constituent 
parts can be extended or contracted to set expectations regarding political behavior. The Court 
establishes that only the most explicit and inappropriate uses of official power satisfy a 
corruption charge. As the Court’s parsing of ‘official act’ (the quo component) reveals, only acts 
that unequivocally deploy governmental apparatus are explicit enough to be a quo; merely 
instructing a subordinate to meet with a donor, or speaking of a donor favorably, do not commit 
government resources with sufficient definitiveness. Moreover, the Court’s theory of constituent 
service suggests that only a high level of impropriety (speaking to the relational pro) will be 
corrupt; representatives are expected to take action that benefits their constituents, and realism 
dictates that representatives will likely be more amenable to taking such action when the 
constituent has curried favor. Presumably there is some point at which currying of favor becomes 
illicit, but the Court leaves it unclear where this might be. The compound effect of the Court’s 
reasoning is to tightly constrain bribery offenses.  
                                                 
64 Id. at 2372. 
65 Id. at 2375. 
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This view of bribery suggests a remarkably liberated view of the boundaries of 
acceptable governance, and correspondingly minimal norms of duty. By describing McDonnell’s 
conduct as prospectively constituent service rather than unequivocally an instance of bribery, the 
Court implies a characterization of politicians as the pawns of whichever constituent can offer 
the strongest incentives to take a particular course of action.
66
 The Court rejects the attempt to 
deploy anti-corruption law in a manner that obligates officials to behave in a manner that can be 
characterized as remotely public-minded. There is no obligation – at least not one that can be 
made legally operational – for representatives to act with neutrality or disinterest in the discharge 
of their office.  
McDonnell thus has a unique status among the Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence: it 
does not merely delimit a particular blackletter facet of the anti-corruption regime (as did its 
predecessor opinions), but expresses a substantive view of political integrity. Corruption, in the 
Court’s view, should not be identified with any political behavior beyond misuse of public power 
so blatant it is theft. The Court therefore abjures anti-corruption laws that seek to advance 
broadly public-minded conduct through aggressive means such as criminalization, because such 
measures may condemn behavior that the Court deems tolerable political practice.  The Court 
thereby disowns the advancement of civic governance, specifically by asserting that officials 
have no obligation to act with neutrality or disinterest. 
II. NORMATIVE AND STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF MINIMALIST ANTI-CORRUPTION 
This Section works through the Court’s distinctive view of representation, long implied 
in the case law and now given substantive expression in McDonnell. The Court has committed to 
a particular theory of democracy which opposes diverse efforts to imbue politics with 
                                                 
66 In the discussion of federalism concerned relating to the application of federal law to state officials, the Court 
further emphasizes that McDonnell’s might fall within “the permissible scope of interactions between state officials 
and their constituents.” Id. at 2373. 
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expectations of public-regardingness. By impairing attempts to obligate officials to behave in a 
public-regarding way, the Court facilitates a political system oriented around self-interested 
conduct by representatives. This Section concludes by extrapolating the ultimate effect on 
regulation of corruption: the electorate becomes the last and only bulwark of civic integrity. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Agonist Politics 
McDonnell condones partiality in treatment of constituents and permits self-interested 
allegiances to be the engine of democracy. This view entails deeper normative commitments: the 
Court advances an approach to representative-constituent relations based in delegate theory, and 
an agonist approach to democracy most prominently expressed in the contemporary literature by 
interest group pluralism. These political views exclude the position that representatives are 
obligated to disinterestedly select policies that will best benefit the entire polity,
67
 and more 
generally challenge a civic approach that conceives of governance as a collective project.  
1. Democracy as structured conflict: delegate theory and agonist politics 
The conflict between these paired approaches to representation specifically and 
governance generally has been the subject of extensive scholarly analysis, but need only be 
briefly reviewed here.
68
 Delegate theory asserts that representatives advance the views of those 
                                                 
67 The distinction between representatives as delegate and representatives as trustees explored below is a normative 
distinction. The descriptive equivalent is the distinction between a delegate who is loyal in terms of policy 
preferences and one who is competent, another axis on which voters might have various preferences (some voters 
might prefer predictable, loyal representatives, while others might prefer competent ones). See, e.g., Justin Fox and 
Kenneth W. Shotts, Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability, 71 J. POL. 1225, 1225 (considering 
popular reaction when a politician “shares the public’s policy preferences, yet, at the same time…has poor 
judgment”, and comparing voter reaction to “policies” as opposed to “outcomes”). This is distinct from the 
delegate/trustee dichotomy. The delegate/trustee distinction offers two principled and opposed approaches to how 
representatives should act, while the policy/competence distinction addresses two features which voters, 
presumably, both want to be maximized (loyalty and competence).  
68 The delegate/trustee distinction has long and complex historical roots. James Madison is one of the first 
champions of a nuanced version of delegate theory, wherein representatives simultaneously represent particular 
interests while attempting to achieve a higher degree of enlightenment than those they represent; Edmund Burke, 
conversely, advances the proposition that representatives should be pure trustees, and solely advance the collective 
good. See HANNAH PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION, 191-193 (1967) (comparing and contrasting the 
Madisonian and Burkean approaches, and observing in particular that Madison speaks of interests of factions while 
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whom they are partial, or feel a sense of obligation. In a democracy this is most typically the 
block of voters who are responsible for a representative’s electoral victory, though as discussed 
infra the Court adopts such a minimalist view so as to include as legitimate delegators any party 
towards whom a delegatee representative feels gratitude. The subsequent political dynamic 
orients around power, as citizens vie to obtain sway over their representatives in order to realize 
favored policies and preferable allocation of state resources.
69
 Democracy becomes a 
confrontational game of striving to obtain leverage over representatives – be it through votes, 
private benefits that do not qualify as bribery, or any other action that generates gratitude – and 
converting this leverage into favorable governmental action.  
Such an approach to democracy can be characterized as agonist. Democracy is a 
framework that structures political competition over resources and a mechanism for expressing 
the polity’s preferences. In contemporary scholarship, the most prominent conceptualization of 
agonist democracy has been interest group pluralism, which characterizes democracy as a power 
struggle between various factions.
70
 Interest group pluralism extends the self-interested character 
                                                                                                                                                             
Burke generally identifies interests as being of the polity as a whole); BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 185-186 (1997) (comparing and contrasting Burke and Madison). 
69 Schumpeter, supra note 12, is the most prominent advocate of this approach. Dahl, supra note 12, at 68, offers a 
rather waggish description when he states “the essence of all competitive politics is the bribery of the electorate by 
politicians.” See also Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 
23, 31 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (endorsing the competitive 
understanding of democracy). Such an understanding of democracy has an interpretive ally in public choice theory, 
which characterizes politics as the interaction of separate individuals to allocate resources despite conflicting 
interests. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (presuming politics serves as a coordinating mechanism for 
gratifying individualistic though not necessarily selfish desires). Broadly speaking, in legal scholarship these various 
ideas have found their most vocal expression in those who critique progressive approaches to campaign finance and 
republicanism more generally. See Cain, supra note 12; Gey, supra note 13. 
70 Dahl, supra note 12, at 84 offers a precis of the assumptions that underlie pluralism. The appropriate impact of 
interest group pluralism upon judicial review has been much debated, with the core question being if a Court may 
look more harshly upon legislation that can be explained as the result of a ‘pluralist’ capture of government 
resources. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) 
(arguing that reasonableness requirements should limit explicit expressions of private power through the 
government); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in America Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); cf. Einer 
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31 (1991) 
25 
MCDONNELL AND ANTI-CORRUPTION’S LAST STAND 
of delegate relationships between trustees and constituents to the totality of democratic practice. 
The unfolding of democracy is merely the expression of competing preferences held by citizens, 
and their ability to successfully have their preferences realized through the vehicle of 
representation. The normative foundation of the approach is the unmitigated pursuit of self-
interest, as citizens form blocks based on preferences, and those blocks attempt to advance their 
particular goals. The actual unfolding of politics does not presume public-minded thinking on 
behalf of participants in the system (other than basic penalty-enforced rule obedience), nor does 
it have particular normative space for such a concept. In such a system, the only reason that 
needs to be given to exonerate from a charge of corruption is that formal procedures were 
obeyed.  
The McDonnell Court has not merely aligned with the delegate/agonist theories; it has 
adopted an aggressively minimalist forms of them. Even a delegate theory of representation can 
impose standards for how one may attempt to influence a representative (a process typically 
attempted by voting and perhaps lobbying); indeed, the definition of bribery sets the line as to 
where such influence becomes unequivocally unacceptable. McDonnell suggests, however, that 
even the transfer of significant amounts of private benefit may qualify as (marginally) 
acceptable, so long as the acts can be vindicated as constituent service
71
 or are not the direct 
expenditure of governmental resources. By imposing so few limitations upon how constituents 
may attempt to influence representatives, the Court’s approach exacerbates the ferocity of the 
agonist competition and minimizes expectations of representative integrity.
72
  
                                                                                                                                                             
(challenging the proposition that interest group pluralism should result in enhanced judicial review of seemingly 
private-regarding state conduct). 
71 McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2372. Stephenson, supra note 4, has observed that the Court “places undue weight on 
concerns about chilling (allegedly desirable conduct”). Cf. Thompson, supra note 27, at 84-88 (describing some of 
the hazards that can come from the ostensibly innocent activities associated with constituent services). 
72 See Section II.B for a game theoretic explanation of this pattern. 
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2. Good governance as commitment to the public good: trustee theory and civic politics 
The agonist approach to democracy has been challenged by theories that claim that 
representatives should disinterestedly advance the public good in their decision-making. The 
trustee approach to representation asserts that representatives should advance the broader 
interests of the polity, rather than directly implement the desires of constituents towards whom 
they are partial.
73
 As the term suggests, the trustee relationship emphasizes trust rather than 
influence or reciprocity. Constituents trust their representatives to behave with integrity and 
prudence in political conduct, and representatives trust their constituents to elect them for their 
general probity and ability, not because they serve as effective mechanisms for achieving 
constituents’ specific wants. Trustee theory has its corollary in civic theories of governance that 




Civic governance disavows mercenary reciprocity as the driver of political decision-
making. In prizing neutrality in process and disinterest from particular allegiances, the civic 
approach condemns public decisions undertaken because a constituent desires a particular 
outcome, or because a representative feels beholden to a particular constituent (or faction). A 
decision made in accordance with civic principles should be hypothetically justifiable to all 
members of a polity by reference to shared values.
75
 This does not mean, of course, that in a 
                                                 
73 See Pitkin, supra note 68, at 127 (both describing and critiquing the role of representative as a trustee). Manin, 
supra note 68, at 236 offers a summary of different approaches, and notes a change even in trustee understandings of 
representation, where the relationship has shifted (along with the scale of democracy) from personal and based in 
faith in the representative character to image-based, with a stronger component of each representative making an 
‘offer.’ He thus implies that the character of even the trustee theory has weakened somewhat. 
74 James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
87, 126 (2000) (“Republicanism typically relies on what is sometimes called the ‘trustee’ model of political 
representation”). See generally note 11 supra. 
75 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1544 (“Under republican approaches to politics, laws must be supported by 
argument and reasons; they cannot simply be fought for or be the product of self-interested ‘deals.’ Private-
regarding reasons are an insufficient basis for legislation. Political actors must justify their chocies by appealing to a 
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civic framework a representative may not take action that benefits a constituent, but only that 
such action should be legitimate in terms of the collective good and as a reasonable action in the 
context of the cooperative political project.
76
 
The high-level normative distinction between agonist and civic politics does not, in itself, 
fully determine the blackletter law of corruption. A polity committed to an agonist approach may 
conclude that anti-corruption requires restrictive anti-bribery laws to prevent theft-like misuse of 
state resources; a civic approach may deem that the collective good is well-served by a model of 
political conduct that aggressively facilitates constituent services and that shared reason-giving is 
satisfied as long as minimal anti-bribery regulations are obeyed.
77
 Yet generally speaking the 
commitment of civic politics to mutual regard and collective welfare will tend to reject  the 
‘marketization’ of decisions and thereby condemn purely self-interested reciprocal decisions as 
corrupt. Conversely an agonist approach will treat reciprocal self-interest as business as usual, so 
long as that self-interested bargaining does not become so explicitly transactional as to 
immediately disrupt the basic terms of democratic accountability. Consequently, in their 
                                                                                                                                                             
broader public good.”); cf. Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 4-5 
(1994) (contrasting the liberal treatment of political process as comprised of market-style conflict with the 
republican commitment to serving the public good)). 
76 Thompson, supra note 27, discusses the challenge of mixed motives and legislative action. Habermas, supra note 
75, at 5 observes the limits of the ideals of republican theory given that political life seems ineluctably oriented 
around compromise, in large part because “politically relevant goals are often selected by interests and value 
orientations that are by no means constitutive for the identity of the community at large.” In a republican system, 
however, the “legitimate kind of bargaining certainly depends on a prior regulation of fair terms for achieving 
results, which are acceptable for all parties on the basis of their differing preferences.” This shows a point of 
convergence between the agonist and republican views – both need some space for conflict resolution based on fair 
terms – but substantively the ‘rich’ view of republicanism (which seems conflict resolution as second-best and still 
located in quite substantive norms) from the minimalist view of agonism. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 45-46, 50 
(observing the need for legitimate procedures that allow agonist competition while ensuring such procedures do not 
result in domination).  
77 Moreover the theories may interact in subtle ways: a civic theorist could conclude that operationalizing politics 
may be best achieved by formalizing modes of reciprocity. This conceptual fluidity and complexity can be traced to 
the fact that these issues can be traced to the initial assumptions regarding sovereignty and legitimacy, and how they 
are expressed. It is possible (through various conceptual contortions) to begin with an agonist worldview (politics-
as-market) and end up with restrictive corruption laws, on the grounds that such rules are necessary to make the 
market work; conversely one can begin with a civic worldview (politics-as-collective-project) and (through like 
contortions) reach that the mid-level realization of this collective project is through reciprocal relations with minimal 
external intervention. 
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respective realizations of laws that define political integrity – such quid pro quo anti-bribery 
laws discussed Section I.A – a civic approach will tend to parse particular terms more broadly 
than an agonist approach, thereby capturing a greater array of behavior as illicit.  
These granular features of anti-corruption ultimately devolve upon the normative 
divergence of the two approaches, and their differing assumptions regarding the translation of 
popular sovereignty into legitimate political practice. An agonist might see the exchange of 
favors as political practice constitutive of democratic interaction because the system only serves 
to the structure self-interested allocation of goods. Conversely a civic thinker would likely 
classify the same conduct as violating the obligation to serve the public good that lies at the heart 
of the shared socio-political project.  
This relationship between high-level norms and the implementation of anti-corruption 
law reveals the doctrinal and substantive unity in the Court’s approach. McDonnell is the first 
opinion to make this link explicit. While the lineage of official corruption cases prior to 
McDonnell indicated an inclination towards narrow sweep in the technical treatment of bribery, 
it the Court’s discussion of constituent relationships McDonnell that demonstrates this emerges 
from the Court’s agonist norms. 
B. The Systemic Effects of Agonist Anti-Corruption Jurisprudence 
It would be an unwarranted extrapolation to conclude that the Court deems civic 
approaches to be invalid. McDonnell merely indicates that the Court identifies the reciprocal 
practices of delegate theory agonism to be a legitimate political behavior and will protect it from 
being infringed by regulation.
78
 Yet the Court’s commitment to protecting agonist political 
                                                 
78 In this regards the Court’s decision might have scholarly allies who have embraced neutrality among conceptions 
of politics as the appropriate judicial posture. See Elhauge, supra note 64, at 48 (observing that striking down 
governmental decisions that are the result of interest group pluralism itself inappropriately imposes a particular view 
of legitimate democratic procedure through the judicial process); see also Kathleen Sullivan, Political Money and 
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practice has the systemic effect of impairing the viability of civic approaches to politics. In the 
absence of conditions that temper its practice, agonism will crowd out alternatives due to the 
systemic effects of its competitive character. If a sufficient number of representatives and 
constituents adopt agonist approaches, they will out-compete (in terms of resource procurement) 
any remainder that tries to adopt a civic approach. Agonist participants will secure as many 
resources as they can through political competition, whereas practitioners of a civic approach 
will seek to take conduct oriented towards the benefit of the entire polity and fail to protectively 
undertake self-aggrandizing
79
 behavior.  
Consequently, if the practice of politics is not generally civic in character, civic 
representatives (unwilling to engage in practices such as logrolling or transactional exchanges of 
political favors) will receive disproportionately small allocations for their constituents. This can 
be understood as a corollary of their respective norms. Agonists do not need to justify the 
legitimacy of their conduct (beyond minimum obedience to procedure), whereas civic democrats 
would seek to undertake action that could be justified by a more reflective consideration of the 
public good.
80
 Civic participants thus suffer a competitive disadvantage in the realization of 
political goals; civic representatives will enjoy fewer partisan victories, and their constituents be 
                                                                                                                                                             
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 680 (1997) (arguing that campaign finance restrictions 
inappropriately impose a specific view of governance upon the political process). 
79 By ‘self-aggrandizing’ behaviour, this analysis presumes that a given constituency wishes to maximize its benefit, 
and thus a representative who wishes to maximize her own benefit must ensure maximize returns for the 
constituency. This permits the interests of representatives and constituents to coincide in the first instance. This 
analysis, however, does not make assumptions about the type of benefits that representative wants. Typically a 
representative desires re-election and thus seeks to please a majority of her constituency. Conversely a 
representative such as McDonnell presumably wishes for private self-aggrandizement through office; yet this will 
not occur if constituents are not also likewise aggrandized. The difference is the election-seeking representative will 
seek to appease a different (and presumably) much broader demographic, whereas McDonnell need only aggrandize 
those constituents willing to provide private benefits. 
80 ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 77, 164 (1982) relates this problem to the prisoner’s 
dilemma. After observing that pluralist approaches to politics face the prisoner’s dilemma, he later asserts that what 
might be called a civic approach attempts to resolve it “by exhorting them to be nicer to one another”. Thus while 
agonism results in the costs of regulating political conflict, civic approaches attempt to wave away a basic feature of 
politics through baseless idealism.  
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allocated fewer resources. This can be understood as a multi-player repeat-variation of the 
prisoner’s dilemma
81
 – a collectively minded, fundamentally cooperative civic approach may
82
 
offer greater benefits for all if universally adopted (or, more precisely, if enough participants 
adopt a civic approach such that it dominates in political practice), but once enough participants 
realize they can obtain greater benefits by ‘defecting’ and procuring interest group pluralist type 
outcomes even at the cost of public welfare, those who fail to adopt such an agonist approach 
                                                 
81 The literature on this topic is vast. Significantly, the dilemma presented here does not result in a devolution to the 
state of nature, it merely results in a stable form of agonist politics. See, e.g., Robert Alexrod, The Emergence of 
Cooperation among Egoists, 75 APSR 306, 307 (1981) (observing how reciprocity can result in stable systems 
among self-interested actors such as legislators). See also Robert Boyd & Jeffrey P. Loberbaum, No pure strategy is 
evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 327 NATURE 58; Theodore C. Bergstrom, Evolution 
of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 70 (2002). Comparing agonist and civic 
approaches to representative politics is better modelled as a prisoner’s dilemma than a stag hunt, because defection 
(that is, agonist behavior) will produce better outcomes regardless of whether players defect or cooperate. If 
everyone defects, the result is a stable agonist game; if one (a small number) of representatives defect, the result is 
that they can extract greater resources from the political process than cooperators; and if a large number of 
representatives defect, the result is a stable agonist equilibrium. In short, at least in a one-shot situation, defection is 
never a bad strategy in representation. The result in multi-shot scenarios is more complex, as representatives may 
realize a civic approach could produce greater goods for all over time. However, difficulties with detecting 
defection, especially given masking of agonist conduct through political rhetoric, means costs must be high to deter 
defection. See generally Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz, Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative 
Democracy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 427, 434-435 (2009) (observing that deception might become a common strategy 
even where deliberation occurs, in order to send signals of cooperation; participation in deliberation is a classic 
marker of civic thinking, and deceptive deliberation would allow a representative to send a false signal of civic 
rather than agonist behaviour). If defection costs are low and detection probability is low, it is likely the only stable 
equilibrium is mutual agonism.  
82 This article does not postulate that civic approaches are superior in terms of collective welfare (that is, in a 
prisoners’ dilemma the payoff for the civic approach is ‘R’ in, eg, Alexrod, supra note 81, at 306). Rather it merely 
observes that the Court’s approach works to curtail civic approaches, which may be beneficial. Thinkers such as 
Gey, supra note 13, Shapiro, supra note 12, and Habermas, supra note 75, observe the various deficiencies of the 
civic approach: it may drown out marginal voices; it may reduce the range of options available to a polity by 
reducing conflict; and it may not be realistic in light of diversity and the range of human commitments within a 
single polity.  
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will be disadvantaged.
83
 The systemic effect will be to produce a vicious spiral whereby all 
participants are induced to adopt an agonist approach.
84
  
McDonnell has a profound effect on this dynamic.
85
 The Court indicates that it has a 
substantive commitment to protecting agonist political practice and that it will nullify certain 
efforts to use anti-corruption law to punish ‘defectors’ from civic-minded politics. It thereby 
deprives the government of at least some tools to advance civic-minded governance. This 
impairs punishment of non-cooperators from civic practice, thereby incentivizing agonist 
conduct.
86
 As discussed above, those who continue to civically ‘cooperate’ in a context 
dominated by agonist practice (‘non-cooperation’) will be particularly poorly off. Where agonist 
political practice is the protected dominant model, representatives are ‘safest’ behaving as partial 
representatives towards those whom propitiate them, and that constituents are ‘safest’ when their 
approach to representatives is to try to ‘buy’ them (using means just short of bribery) in order to 
secure governmental support.  
                                                 
83 An alternate way of conceiving of agonist practice is as ‘self-entrenching’ in the absence of direct mechanism for 
discouraging the practice. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 215 
YALE. L. J. 400, 426 (2015). Agonist political conduct by one representative will encourage such conduct by others; 
thus without some sort of external mechanism that limits such agonist behaviour, it will ultimately embed itself into 
the political process. This property of agonism occurs at a higher level of abstraction (process rather than substance) 
compared to types of policies described by Levinson and Sachs. Representatives do not set out to advance an agonist 
agenda; rather they behave as agonists because it is instrumentally beneficial for their final goals (achievement of 
certain policies or retaining office).  
84 A critical mechanism by which this spiral occurs will be that representatives will be harshly disciplined by voters 
if they fail to provide goods to constituents, and they will be unable to do so if they engage in a civic approach in a 
generally agonist environment (they will be seen as at best incompetent). Subsequently representatives will be 
encouraged to adopt at least a very conservative ‘suspicious’ strategy (at best STFT, to use the terminology of Boyd 
and Lorberbaum, supra note 81), making it difficult for civic approaches to become stable. 
85 Of course, McDonnell and its predecessors do not solely determine the character of US politics; a vast variety of 
federal laws influence the political realities and expound upon the behavior of the legislative and executive 
branches. (Point to campaign finance law as an arena that while closely related, cuts in a different direction; for 
other broad examples think of the voting rights revolution and the renewed use of the commerce clause to enforce 
civil rights.)  
86 Removal of criminal anti-corruption tools both reduces the cost of detection for marginally legitimate agonist 
behaviour, and reduces the penalties for such behaviour. Using the classic TRPS outcomes present in Axelrod, supra 
note 81, and Boyd and Lorberbaum, supra note 81, it increases the value of T in particular, as defection in a civic 
dynamic is less likely to be caught or punished. The result of increasing the benefits of defection is to reduce the 
likelihood of cooperation, and thus eliminate a civic approach. 
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McDonnell also establishes that the Court’s commitment to this approach operates 
through at least two mechanisms. The Court is committed to defending agonist politics as a 
matter of substantive principle, as McDonnell is the first to firmly articulate.
87
 Thus inducing the 
Court to tolerate civic anti-corruption jurisprudence at the risk of impairing reciprocal agonist 
political practices would require overcoming a unanimous bench, and there is little to suggest 
countervailing momentum in the official anti-corruption jurisprudence.
88
  
As Section I.B describes, the Court’s holdings have been long-founded in technical 
blackletter holdings that do not have formal political connotations. Thus, even were the Court to 
retreat from its substantive political commitment to protecting reciprocal constituent-
representative relationships, its common law holdings would still cut against the civic view of 
corruption. This entails that reversing the direction of official corruption law would require 
unwinding an established line of precedent. Moreover, these doctrinal commitments have 
support from across the political spectrum (perhaps explaining the surprising unanimity of the 
official corruption jurisprudence): conservatives attack anti-corruption law as federal intrusion 
and the offensive expansion of government power, whereas liberals have cause to be wary of 
holdings that might be unfriendly to defendants in the realms of statutory interpretation and 
criminal procedure.  
C. Voters as Civic Integrity’s Last Stand 
In McDonnell’s wake, penalization of reciprocal or self-serving conduct by 
representatives and, more generally, advancement of civic governance must come from the 
political process. Thus the knock-on effect of the Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence is to 
                                                 
87 This view may have been intimated in Sun-Diamond, though the underlying theory was not developed as clearly. 
See 526 U.S. at 407 (arguing that a broad anti-corruption statute that generally criminalized gifts would become 
over-expansive in part because officials are likely always dealing with matters relevant to their constituents). 
88 Though some rumblings in the campaign finance domain suggest some of the bench might accept an alternate 
approach, as described in Section III.B.2 this faces its own obstacles. 
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throw policing of political behavior on to the electorate.
89
 If the electorate wishes its 
representatives to behave in a civic-minded manner, it must enforce that view of politics directly. 
The electorate could advance a civic anti-corruption in two forms. Firstly, they could 
elect representatives who prioritize passing and enforcing civic anti-corruption legislation in a 
manner that satisfies the Court’s scrupulous demands.
90
 Yet this approaches faces overwhelming 
challenges. As described above, the Court has shown animus to broad-sweeping anti-corruption 
laws such that it is unclear if any level of punctiliousness by the legislature and executive will be 
satisfactory.
91
 It is also difficult to define an ‘anti-corruption’ candidacy, given the level of 
abstraction entailed in the concepts of civic integrity and corruption. This feature presents in 
politics by the oft-ironic fact that running on a platform of reform or anti-corruption is a 
commonplace of politicians (including those who are later roundly criticized for or convicted of 
corrupt conduct),
92
 such that selecting a representative for having such a platform appears an 
                                                 
89 In effect, the Court has denied the protection of civic integrity a right (that is, one that can be enforced through 
litigation). See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286 (2012). In Levinson’s analysis, some of the 
reasons for electing votes over rights might support the curtailing of rights-style enforcement of civic anti-
corruption. For example, rights are less flexible than votes, and given the possible oppressive effects of civic 
integrity, the use of a rights-style approach to enforce them could prove dangerous. However, rights are also more 
durable, and given the fragility of civic integrity described herein, this might support rights as a possible mechanism 
for enforcing civic integrity. See id. at 1324-32. 
90 For example, with regards to the intangible right to honest services, Congress could have drafted §1346 to 
explicitly include self-dealing or otherwise identify the nature and requirements of the fiduciary duty to sweep more 
broadly, thus making clear the statute’s “core” included more than just bribery and kickbacks. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 
408; see also id. at 416-23 (Scalia, concurring) (observing the various questions that §1346 leaves unanswered about 
the character of the honest services doctrine). Of course, had Congress done so, and in particularly had it done so 
unartfully, it might have risked increasing the likelihood that the statute would run afoul of federalism concerns, or 
that the Court would perform a similar maneuver as it did in McDonnell and interpret the statutory language 
extremely narrowly.  
91 Indeed, that McDonnell shows a substantive commitment to delegate representation and protection of constituent 
services reveals that advancing civic politics may encounter horns of a dilemma. If drafting attempts to explicitly 
enumerate prohibited conduct, it creates opportunities for both circumvention by crafty politicians, see supra 
Section I.A and Philp supra note 18, and narrow construal of the language by the Courts (as the Court interpreted 
the language of ‘official act’ in McDonnell). Conversely, if drafting does not define offenses crisply, it runs the fate 
of narrow judicial construal, as befell §1346 in Skilling, or, as Justices Scalia advocated in Skilling and Sorich, being 
outright ruled void for vagueness.  
92 Johnston, supra note 3, at 200-214 sketches some of the general forms this may take; for example in advanced 
democracies where corruption takes the primary form of electoral influence buying, “corruption issues are a 
tempting way to criticize a regime without directly challenging its power or claims to rule”, at 203, because the 
corruption reflects a basic wealth-and-power compromise has been legitimized in the political structure. In polities 
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uncertain gamble. Finally, given that candidates appeal to voters across an array of issues, and 
that voters wish to have many interests satisfied, it seems unlikely that having a clear and precise 
plan to draft laws that will substantively advance civic-minded conduct while carefully obeying 
the Court’s mandates would emerge as a decisive wedge issue. The only way a candidate could 
concretely adopt such a posture would be through a guarantee to respond to or challenge the 
impact of the Court’s official corruption rulings, an unlikely candidate to rally voters or satisfy 
constituent demand.  
In the alternate, voters could advance a civic governance directly by abjuring agonist 
practice, including their elections of candidates. In the simplest form, this would require that 
citizens vote not based on self-interest or personal allegiances, but rather a commitment to the 
civic good.
93
 This approach offers the immediate benefit of transforming politics without the risk 
of running afoul of the Court (which has neither means nor apparent inclination to mandate 
agonist representation). This solution would effect a tectonic shift in American politics – it 
would require, for example, that voters expel representatives who engaged in typical practices 
such as logrolling or pork barrel funding (including of voters’ own districts), or favoritism in 
constituent services that is far from as egregious as McDonnell’s. 
Such an approach is unrealistic, in that it would require voters to vote against their self-
interest in selecting representatives who would neither favor their particular supporters nor favor 
their districts’ own constituents. Given the current configuration of American democracy and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
defined by oligarchic kinship (more akin to machine politics), reforms may merely result in the mutation of the 
character of corruption, id. at 211. Examples of such reformers-becoming-corrupt include former Chicago governor 
Rod Blagojevich, see Joanna Lin, he campaigned as a reformer, L. A. TIMES, Dec 10, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/10/nation/na-gov-profile10 (observing how Blagojevich campaigned as a 
reformer prior to his arrest on corruption charges); and cycles of reform and corruption in developing countries. See, 
e.g., Uki Goni, The Corrupt Zigzag, an Argentine Dance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/opinion/the-corrupt-zigzag-an-argentine-dance.html (characterizing the 
‘cyclical’ nature of reformers becoming corrupt). 
93 Indeed, such a commitment must underlie many of the civic approaches to politics. See supra note 13.  
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generally patronage-oriented nature,
94
 any group of voters who selected a representative who 
implemented such a principled approach would face serious disadvantages. This is an 
instantiation of the tendency of polities to drift towards agonism where it is a protected form of 
political behavior, as described in Section II.B.  
Moreover, even if there were enough momentum to implement a civic approach across 
the political environment, it would be a fragile and likely unstable condition. Once any 
representatives began to operate as interest group pluralists (which, if implemented effectively, 
would likely produce benefits for their favored constituents), representatives and constituents 
who retained a ‘civic’ approach would be disadvantaged in the allocation of goods. While those 
who remained civic-minded might attempt to ‘punish’ defectors from civic-mindedness, this 
would itself create an agonist political dynamic,
95
 as politics evolved into a battle between those 
approaching politics as self-interested agonists and those advocating a civic approach. 
Implementing civic politics through democratic process itself would also face difficulties of 
detection – defectors would likely mask their self-interested or constituent-serving behavior in 
rhetoric justifying it as publicly minded and legitimate.
96
 Ironically, this is precisely how 
McDonnell defended this conduct in principle. He claimed his conduct was normatively 
legitimate because it would aid Virginia’s economy (as well as benefit a constituent who just 
happened to be a patron).
97
 Likewise representatives who wished to cloak their interest group 
pluralist conduct as civic-minded could simply insist their preferred policies were in the public 
interest. While such claims might at times be met with skepticism, a civic environment 
                                                 
94 For a general description of such practices, see Thompson, supra note 27. 
95 See Bergstrom, supra note 81. 
96 See supra note 81. 
97 136 S.Ct. at 2366. 
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characterized by constant suspicion of other participants’ motives will quickly lose its civic (and 
perhaps civil) character. 
Thus, establishing civic politics through elections alone would face tremendous 
obstacles; only a polity with a unified vision of the collective good could possibly hope to 
implement a civic political dynamic. In a society with the diversity of geography and identity 
groups as the US, such an approach seems idealistic at best. 
III. THE FRUSTRATION OF BROAD REFORM AND THE NARROWER PATHS FORWARD 
The Court’s view of substantive politics, and its narrower blackletter impact on anti-
corruption enforcement,
 98
 is at odds with many popular legal and political movements. This 
Section considers how the Court’s substantive view of politics complicates topical agitation for 
reform, and then considers strategies for resuscitating civic anti-corruption in the light of the 
bench’s solidarity.  
A. Judicial Agonism as a Barrier to Political Reform 
The Court’s view of political representation expressed in its official corruption 
jurisprudence has especially salient ramifications for two topical domains of law: campaign 
finance regulation and efforts to address ‘institutional’ corruption. 
1. The liberal whipsaw: campaign finance jurisprudence and official anti-corruption 
The contours of corruption have been the fulcrum of campaign finance jurisprudence ever 
since Buckley (rather contentiously) established anti-corruption as the rationale that can vindicate 
infringement of rights at issue in campaign finance regulation.
99
 Unlike the law of official 
corruption, corruption in the campaign finance context has been a source of fierce partisan 
                                                 
98 Some early analysts of McDonnell have suggested the first-order doctrinal implications may be quite narrow. See 
Stephenson supra note 4. 
99 424 U.S. at 27-28. For a discussion of the challenges to the corruption rationale, see Strauss, supra note 26. 
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dispute on the bench.
100
 The more staunchly conservative justices have argued that, as in official 
corruption, only campaign finance contributions akin to quid pro quo bribes should be 
prohibited.
101
 Conversely, the liberals have argued for a conception of corruption that sweeps 
more broadly and thus permit regulation of a broader range of contributions, including those that 
are only ambivalently contributions (such as issue advertisements).
102
 The liberals support this 
more expansive concept of corruption by claiming excessive campaign finance funding – 
regardless of if it assumes a quid pro quo form -- threatens the public interest.
103
 The liberals 
wish to ensure representatives do not become excessively beholden to overweening private 
interest and make political decisions through a neutral process oriented that considers citizen 
interest fairly, as well as prevent broader pollution of the electoral atmosphere.
104
 In 
conceptualizing of this argument in terms of corruption and suggesting that general public-




However, while the campaign finance conservatives have advanced a crisply minimalist 
theory of corruption – they argue that voters are able to police representatives adequately such 
that only bribery needs to be criminalized, a claim that echoes the consensus official corruption 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 19. 
101 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (corruption is quid pro quo only) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296-298 
(Kennedy, dissenting)); McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1444-45 (observing the resilience of quid pro quo prevention as a 
valid rationale for surviving judicial scrutiny). 
102 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (identifying a broader corrupting threat from “complian[ce] with the wishes of large 
contributors”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, dissenting) (advocating the broader antidistortion rationale 
originally offered as a liberal touchstone in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)); 
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1466-67 (Breyer, dissenting) (“the anticorruption interest that drives Congress to regulate 
campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than the plurality acknowledges. It is an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions.”). 
103 See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1468 (observing the need to “limit payments in order to help maintain the 
integrity of the electoral process.”)  
104 The liberals have vociferously rejected the idea that their broader concept of corruption is just an equality 
rationale. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, dissenting), but see Strauss, supra note 26. 
105 The liberal wing also has civic impulses in that it has a concern with the broader nature of political discourse, in 
particular protecting the demotic quality of the type of discourse that shapes electoral outcomes. See, e.g., Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 469-72 (Stevens, dissenting); McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, dissenting). 
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jurisprudence – the liberals have struggled to articulate the precise substance and boundaries of 
their concept of corruption.
106
 While the Court has done little to unify the doctrines of official 
corruption and campaign finance,
107
 it is tempting to impute effects of this parallelism. Whereas 
the conservative justices can maintain a consistently agonist view of politics and minimalist view 
of corruption across domains of law, the liberals struggle to reconcile the narrow view of official 
corruption with an expansive, civically-minded view of campaign finance corruption.
108
 This 
may contribute to the liberal failure to forcefully articulate a unified civic view of politics in the 
campaign finance space, as the liberals have no foundation upon which to build their alternative 
theory. Even if this is not a causal relationship, it does suggest a deficit of imagination that 
impacts the liberal innovation regarding the law of corruption. 
This sharp contestation regarding political integrity in elections – and the impact 
campaign finance can have upon voter choice – is particularly salient given that elections 
remains the last mechanism for realizing of civic integrity. If campaign financing threatens 
political integrity, electoral choice may be a fragile vehicle for regulating politics, and the tools 
constrained by the official corruption jurisprudence may be especially critical for realize civic 
integrity. More specifically, if successful candidacy requires substantial campaign donations and 
thus representatives enter politics preemptively beholden to certain constituents and interests, 
civic public-mindedness is sabotaged before officials even assume office.
109
 The liberal wing has 
                                                 
106 See Eisler, supra note 19, at __ (observing the failure of the liberal wing to coherently advance a theory of 
politics that supports their broad view of corruption and support of regulatory intervention in the political sphere). 
107 See Brown, supra note 30. 
108 It is worth noting that conservative justices have penned both Sun-Diamond and McDonnell. Yet nothing 
prevented a liberal justice from concurring and thereby carving out a space wherein to create consistency with the 
campaign finance realm. It would be easy to see how McDonnell might be used as a club by conservatives in the 
campaign finance space. 
109 See Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2009) (arguing that 
the current campaign finance regime already destroy the civic character of politics); Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela 
S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV.  1705, 1706 (1999) (observing that the 
current campaign finance regime creates a perverse system by allowing unlimited consumption (expenditure) while 
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expressed its own doubts regarding the ability of voters to adequately police this process in 
raising concerns regarding the impact of campaign finance upon voters.
110
 The need for forceful 
and creative government regulation to realize political integrity for both representatives and 
citizens is present in the debate over campaign finance, yet curiously it has made no inroads in 
the official corruption context.
111
  
2. Agonist representation and institutional corruption 
The idea of corruption has also been adapted by contemporary reformers to challenge 
broader political dynamics. This movement characterizes American political culture as 
pervasively malformed, such that inappropriate partiality and corrosive self-interest drives 
official conduct in the general discharge of public office. Most prominent among these activists 
has been Larry Lessig who, drawing on work by Dennis Thompson, has sought both academic 
and political means of reforming the ‘institutional corruption’ that afflicts the contemporary 
political system. Lessig identifies bad ‘dependence’ as the defining feature of institutional 
corruption: representatives, and the systems which they constitute, do not base decisions upon 
the appropriate consideration of popular will or public interest, but rather upon elite private 
interests that have managed to infiltrate the political decision-making structure.
112
 These failures 
need not occur in a deliberate or even conscious manner (as in the typical case of quid pro quo 
bribery), but rather distort the background processes of political decision-making.
113
 
                                                                                                                                                             
artificially constraining the vessel of consumption (contributions), thus creating candidates who are obsessed with 
discrete opportunities for consumption. Yet if the analogy is continued, removing the artificial constraint would just 
result in politicians who are pure gluttons for campaign finance wealth). 
110 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 469-72 (describing the impact of corporate domination of media upon voter 
morale). 
111 Some scholars have argued the two should not be used to inform one another. See Brown, supra note 30, at 233.  
112 Lessig, supra note 26, at 231; see also see also Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand 
“Corruption” to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arbitrary powerholding as a marker of dependence corruption). 
113 Lessig, supra note 26, at 246. 
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The efforts to reform institutional corruption are civic in character, insofar as they wish to 
shift political decision-making from dependence that enables unbridled patronage to dependence 
oriented towards the collective will of the polity. Institutional corruption is distinct in that it 
observes consistent patterns of reciprocity woven into the political structure rather than isolated 
instances of malfeasance, necessitating systemic change. Lessig’s target is not classic agonism 
that identifies conflict between equal citizens as the lifeblood of politics, but rather the 
infiltration of reciprocal patterns that have displaced the legitimate bases for political decision-
making.
114
 The characteristic marker of institutional corruption is the pervasive and subterranean 
presence of partiality disconnected from popular rule in political decision-making. Institutional 
corruption, in effect, identifies a crisis of democratic legitimacy due to a disjunction between 
citizen sovereignty and the realities of governance. If institutional corruption were eliminated, 
there still might be agonist competition for political goods, but it would occur on terms that 
recognize it is the welfare of equally respected citizens, not furtively influential elites, that 
should guide public decisions.  
The official corruption cases suggest, however, that the Court will disfavor the spirit of 
institutional corruption reform.
115
 In offering a robust defense of partiality in representative-
constituent relations, the Court rejects precisely the demand for disinterested dependence upon 
popular will that inspires institutional corruption activists. The Court’s extensive protection of 
constituent services (founded in its minimalist agonism) excludes changes that would eliminate 
                                                 
114 Id. at 235 (observing Congress suffers from the presence of a lobbyist-fed ‘gift economy’). See also  Zephyr 
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373-75 (2009) (describing an originalist 
understanding of corruption that is “self-serving use of public power for private ends”). Teachout’s analysis has a 
more explicitly civic streak, as she identifies an interest in promoting “civic virtue” characterized by “orientation 
towards the public interest.” Id. However, it may be queried if the founders intended this to characterize the entire 
polity, or merely manifest in Congress as they performed their role as those who process and refine interests, and 
more broadly engage in the teleological advancement of the political process. See Pitkin, supra note 68. 
115 Teachout, supra note 114, at 387-397 argues this divergence of the Court is also a divergence from the thought of 
the Framers.  
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institutional corruption, because the Court identifies partiality – evidently, even prolonged, 
system-infiltrating partiality – as a critical aspect of political life. Indeed, the type of political 
conduct undertaken by McDonnell himself is precisely the type of deviation from commitment to 
fair public process that reformers would identify as a particularly egregious manifestation of 
institutional corruption; that McDonnell (and prospectively, as discussed infra, the Court) 
evidently conceives of it as legitimate political behavior reveals a view of politics that could be 
called institutionally corrupt. 
Institutional corruption scholars have advanced various reforms, all of which might face 
challenges from the Court. Some, such as Zephyr Teachout’s progressively originalist claim that 
a broader set of self-aggrandizing behavior should be classified as corrupt,
116
 appeal to the bench 
directly. However, McDonnell – whose facts are precisely the type that Teachout’s reading 
condemns
117
 – suggests there has been little incorporation of this idea. Other reforms sought by 
institutional corruption scholars have been systemic in character – Lessig has agitated for a 
constitutional amendment that would address the current ‘bad’ dependencies, and sought the 
presidency with the intention of implementing parallel political reforms.
118
 While these 
mechanisms would be less initially vulnerable to judicial review, the normative commitments of 
the Court suggest that any such efforts before the current bench should expect harsh treatment. In 
practice, if Lessig is able to achieve such reforms, it would be prudent to ensure precision and 
                                                 
116 See Teachout, supra note 114. See also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFFBOX (2014). 
117 Teachout, supra note 114, at 359 (“The concern was that members of Congress would use their position to enrich 
themselves and their friends.”).  
118 Lessig, supra note 26, at 290. For the reformist character of Lessig’s presidential campaign, see 
https://lessig2016.us/. 
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diligence in the implementation of broader anti-corruption in order to minimize judicial 
opportunities to prune his anti-corruption efforts.
119
 
3. Agonism and the unfortunate realities of American political life 
The Court’s disinclination towards civic governance in the official corruption 
jurisprudence, liberals’ muddled efforts to generate a broader concept of corruption in the 
campaign finance arena, and the Court’s presumptive hostility towards institutional anti-
corruption reforms are particularly alarming given the realities of contemporary American 
politics. The fractures dividing the electorate appear as stark as in any time during the past 
century, splitting along racial, economic, geographical, and ideological lines.
120
 Yet the Court’s 
official corruption jurisprudence exacerbates the practical effects of such fragmentation, as it 
condones political practices wherein representatives implement highly partisan views to 
aggrandize wedge constituencies. Subsequently, the hope that the electorate alone that may 
advance a civic view of integrity rings particularly hollow. 
The Court’s unwillingness to permit robust advancement of civic politics in official anti-
corruption, and its broader approbation of agonist democracy, comes at an inopportune time. 
Conceiving of democracy in agonist terms, and constituent-representative relations as essentially 
acts of reciprocity, conveys certain benefits: it may encourage efficient representation of 
                                                 
119 Notes 82 and 83 supra describe the types of strategies by which a Court might emasculate Lessig’s proposal in 
the same way they might emasculate legislation, deploying the type of discretion judges always have available. See 
generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
120 See generally Carroll Dougherty, 7 things to know about polarization in America, Pew Research Center, June 12, 
2014, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-
america/ (describing heightened levels of partisan polarization among the American populace); Brian Newman & 
Emerson Siegle, The Polarized Presidency: Depth and Breadth of Public Partisanship, 40 PRES. STUD. Q. 342 
(2010) (observing growing levels of partisan identification over time); Clifton B. Parker, but see Cynthia R. Farina, 
Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L.REV. 1689, 1716 (2015) 
(interpreting the Pew survey results and literature to conclude that polarization is worse among activists than among 
the actual population, and that polarization of the electorate is likely not the cause of growing Congressional 
polarization). The rise in partisanship has been cited as a cause of the surprising, and to many, alarming rise of 
Donald Trump’s political career. See, e.g., Clifton B. Parker, The tumultuous 2016 Republican campaign is a 
phenomenon long in the making, Stanford researcher says, STANFORD NEWS SERVICE, 16 March 2016, available at 
http://news.stanford.edu/press-releases/2016/03/16/pr-polarized-voters-konitzer-051616.  
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interests; it prevents subsumption of wedge group views into a collective framework; and its 
realist expectations are unlikely to be disappointed even as it provides a framework that sustains 
adequate governance.
121
 Yet it also exacerbates divisions between groups and shatters any 
perception that the polity has a unified identity or shared values. A civic approach to politics, 
conversely, precisely is founded upon expectations of cooperation and mutual regard among both 
public officials and citizens. By rejecting anti-corruption law as a vehicle for civic politics, the 
Court advances a divisive vision of politics and eliminates one mechanism for requiring public 
officials to emphasize collective regard during a time when divisions within the polity are 
especially ominous. 
B. Braving Agonism, Jurisprudential Innovation, or Circumvention by Federalism 
Implementing anti-corruption measures that enable civic politics in light of the Court’s 
position will prove challenging. As discussed supra, civic politics realized through elections 
alone would tend to prove unstable or difficult to implement, but seems to be the primary 
mechanism left available by the Court. This Section considers three alternative responses. It is 
possible to accept the Court’s championing of agonist politics; to adapt the blackletter doctrine 
that underlies the Court’s holdings such that it advances civic norms; or to adopt anti-corruption 
practices that may not be as vulnerable to nullification by the Supreme Court. 
1. Braving agonism: wanting what you have 
The agonist status quo has its virtues, and has a level of stability as a political practice. 
The Court’s limitation of federal deployment of criminal sanctions is a defensible facet of the 
judicial mandate to ensure that governmental power does not become overreaching or 
                                                 
121 Shapiro, supra note 12, is a particular champion of this, and Dahl, supra note 80, characterizes it as a veritable 
reality.  
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oppressive.
122
 Criminalization of corruption that advances civic values will sweep more broadly 
and likely require a higher level of fluidity or adaptability than crisply defined quid pro quo laws 
that only set the rules of agonist practice. The very attributes that would allow for civic anti-
corruption law tend to raise vagueness concerns and produce opportunities for prosecutorial 
misuse.
123
 Given that (relatively speaking, at least)
124
 the US does not suffer from high levels of 
official corruption, it may be that the current state of affairs is a reasonable equilibrium. Indeed, 
the record suggests that McDonnell’s conduct was not more egregious in part because he was 
concerned about violating anti-corruption laws,
125
 and his actions, while distastefully self-serving 
deviation from the ideal discharge of public office, did not comprise the sort of grand corruption 
or grossly wasteful misuse of government resources that can debilitate a functional state. 
In sum, while the narrow bounds left to criminal anti-corruption by the Court may 
prevent such law from facilitating civic politics, it arguably neither debilitating for the state nor 
fatal to civic anti-corruption. Civic politics can operate through direct political action; despite the 
challenges, such an organic approach may be the most appropriate given the deep normative 
commitments of such a shift. Moreover, even if the effect of the Court’s holdings is to perpetuate 
an agonist political culture in the US, this does not necessarily alone justify a shift in the law. A 
                                                 
122 For a champion of this view, see Silverglate, supra note 11. As Sorich reveals, Silverglate had an evident ally on 
the Court in Scalia.  
123 Such laws could face criticisms similar to those raised by the concurring justices in Skilling, whose hostility to 
“indeterminacy” in the statute lead to the suggestion that §1346 should be struck down rather than merely narrowly 
construed. 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, concurring). Effective civic anti-corruption laws may require such an element of 
indeterminacy to maintain responsiveness to the civic norms that ultimately inform them. See supra note 55. The 
broader explanation for this paradox – that because the norms of integrity derive from political an irreducible 
political reality that is also foundational to law, and trace to first-order legitimacy rather than second-order 
expressions of the processes such legitimacy sustains – lies beyond the ken of this article. A straightforward legal 
positivist view will trace both to power; a refinement of the view may trace both to the character of judgment. See 
generally J. L. AUSTIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (1879); cf. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994). 
124 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2016, 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (ranking the US 16th of 167 nations); see also Johnston, supra 
note 3 (classifying the US as an ‘influence market’, where corruption occurs primarily through campaign finance, 
and thus has less profoundly destructive effects than types of corruption that comprise direct grand theft). 
125 136 S. Ct. at 2364 (McDonnell, in conversation with legal counsel, acknowledging this limitation and observing 
he needs to be careful). 
45 
MCDONNELL AND ANTI-CORRUPTION’S LAST STAND 
narrow view of corruption prevents types of prosecutorial abuse and vindicates the rights of 
defendants, as discussed infra. Moreover, while US politics may not be characterized by public-
minded virtue, American governance remains generally functional. 
However, this apology for agonism concedes too much. Merely because the US does not 
suffer from crippling levels of official corruption does not entail that American politics enjoys 
optimal integrity.
126
 If the institutional corruption and campaign finance reformers are correct, a 
shift toward civic public-mindedness in political culture would be of great benefit to American 
governance. While criminal sanctions that enforce civic politics may not be sufficient to 
transform the political culture, they may be a necessary component, to signal the weight of civic 
values will be rigorously enforced, and to deter gross defection from public-mindedness. 
Reformers such as Lessig may be correct that a broader mechanisms are necessary to implement 
change; but an important tool in shifting such culture is the availability of sanction that deter 
such behavior. The inability to demand public-regardingness through anti-bribery laws may also 
inflect the political culture more generally: McDonnell’s conduct may be a particularly egregious 
example of the type of reciprocity that results in misallocation of government resources, yet it 
was deemed prospectively tolerable. 
2. Jurisprudential innovation: updating doctrinal context for modern corruption 
If the Court is to be reconciled to civic anti-corruption, it will require jurisprudential 
creativity. Such innovation has already begun in a related space, as some scholars and justices 
have argued for a reinterpretation of the First Amendment that would, inter alia, support a more 
                                                 
126 As one study laconically concluded, “Although corruption is not endemic in America as it is in several other 
countries, it does exist.” Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Illegal and Legal Corruption in American 
States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey, Edmond J. Safra Center Journal for Ethics (Dec. 1, 
2014), available at http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-states-some-
results-safra (observing that there have been 20,000 corruption convictions in the past two decades in America, and 
that 5,000 corruption trials are currently ongoing). 
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holistic conception of corruption and thereby permit more extensive campaign finance 
regulation.
127
 The parallel point in the official corruption space would be reconsideration, in light 
of the possible validity of civic governance, of the canons of statutory interpretation and due 
process concerns that underlie the Court’s holdings. The Court’s pruning of the official 
corruption doctrine seems motivated at least in part to protect defendants from the tremendous 
power of the government.
128
 This is a particular form of the general principle that one role of the 
judiciary is to prevent the entrenchment of particular power inequities in political structures;
129
 
one incarnation is the need to protect those accused of crimes from railroading at the hands of the 
prosecutorial apparatus. 
Yet a charge of corruption has unique characteristics. Official corruption occurs when 
those privileged through access to governmental resources abuse their unique power. Corrupt 
conduct circumvents the normal procedures that ensure fairness in citizen access to government, 
as individuals with unique access to political power abuse it. This justifies reconceptualization of 
how the canons of interpretation and due process rights apply. Traditionally such mechanisms 
protect defendants from governmental power, but where the offense itself is predicated upon 
access to governmental power, their uncritical application may perversely reinforce power 
inequities. Corruption ultimately harms citizens who do not have unique power or access to 
governmental decision-making process. Thus the typical role of the Court as the equalizer of 
power is reversed in some respects vis-à-vis corruption prosecutions.
130
 It is the average citizen – 
                                                 
127 OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995). Breyer, supra note 15, offers a less concrete but 
related claim. 
128 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 168-178 (2008) (describing how the rule of lenity favors 
defendants in order to correct for the greater power of government and lack of political clout of most defendants.)  
129 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) provides perhaps the most seminal form of this in the 
concept of representation reinforcement. 
130 The most salient context wherein corruption prosecutions perpetuate power imbalances may be that of 
federalism; federal anti-corruption prosecutions give the federal executive a tool for intervening in state and local 
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lacking special access to the machinery of governmental decision-making – who requires 
additional procedural protection from the judiciary. Therefore anti-corruption statutes could be 
legitimately interpreted in a manner that permits broad sweep in order to encourage public-
mindedness in representative behavior.
131
 In McDonnell, this would permit reading 18 U.S.C. 
§201(a)(3) to include the conduct at issue as official action.  
Civic conceptions of governance can guide such a jurisprudential shift. If governance is a 
collective enterprise and public officials are those given unique capacity to deploy the shared 
powers of this collective enterprise,
132
 they should be expected to adhere to higher standards 
regarding public-mindedness in the discharge of their duties. This stands in opposition to the 
agonist approach, which conceives of officials as just another type of self-interested actor 
participating in the competitive game in order to extract maximal resources.
133
 In a civic view, 
public servants have a distinct role as holders of the distilled decision-making power of the 
electorate – and can legitimately be expected to adjust their conduct to reflect their structurally 
privileged status.  
                                                                                                                                                             
governance, and, on such terms, there is no countervailing pressure state and local officials can apply to the federal 
government. This potential has been the subject of some criticism, including by the McDonnell opinion, id. at 2373. 
See also Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Governments’ Authority to Prosecute Federal 
Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 
700 (2000) (honest services law is harsher on local and state than on federal officials); Brown, supra note 35 
(arguing that following Sabri, the Court will permit federal prosecutions to police state and local conduct). 
131 Cf. Elhauge, supra note 128, at 176-78 (observing that the rule of lenity is often not applied to business crimes). 
Federalism concerns aside, such an argument could also be applied to prosecutions of corrupt public officials, but 
does not seem to be. In terms of the factors by which Elhauge explains selective application of the rule of lenity, 
politicians are not the ‘politically powerless’ that the rule of lenity typically protects; conversely however, whether 
anti-corruption laws are malum prohibitum or malum in se comes down to the difficult question of how political 
norms ought to be enforced.  
132 Such a distinctly civic role for representatives as opposed to the electorate might, in some interpretations, be 
called Madisonian. See supra notes 68. Such an interpretation complicates the classification of Madison as an 
agonist. 
133 Such a view of politicians is expressed in the views of Schumpeter and Dahl, supra note 12. The arguments of 
Lessig and Teachout are premised on the idea that this view is inappropriate, and Teachout in particular argues that 
the Framers held such a view. 
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The analogous reconceptualization of the First Amendment jurisprudence offers a parallel 
model.
134
 That a traditionally negative constitutional right might, given the nature of the modern 
state, expand rather than circumscribe the ambit of state activity could likewise be applied in the 
official corruption context. The power held by public officials, and the need to ensure they 
govern with integrity for the sake of the entire polity, might mean that due process and 
traditional interpretation of statutory reach expands, rather than restricts, the standards by which 
corruption is judged. This would protect the most vulnerable in politics – those citizens who are 
governed and have voice only through their representatives. 
Of course, such a radical transformation of these rights would need to be undertaken with 
delicacy and circumspection. To do so recklessly could remove critical barriers to excessive state 
power and prosecutorial discretion.
135
 A concept as fluid as corruption could readily be abused, 
particularly given the breadth of federal prosecutorial discretion.
136
 One particular blackletter 
accommodation of this reality might be to adjust relevant statutes to impose higher standards 
upon officials (who would be expected to have knowledge of their unique status) alone (that is to 
say, recipients of bribes) but not upon others (that is to say, those who attempt to bribe).
137
 In 
light of the dysfunctional political dynamics in American political representation (a dysfunction 
that renders unrealistic the Court’s currently preferred mode of civic anti-corruption as realized 
                                                 
134 Sunstein, supra note 127, likely advances the fullest form of this. The claim can be succinctly expressed as the 
idea that the First Amendment – traditionally interpreted as restricting government action – should, in the modern 
era of complex networks and sophisticated non-state actors, also mandates positive government conduct. That is, full 
realization of the ends of the First Amendment – access to formation, facilitating political and intellectual 
engagement, sustaining social development – requires the state at times to take action. 
135 See Silverglate, supra note 11. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 533-546 (2001) (observing the benefit to prosecutors of broadly defined criminal statutes, and in 
particular the discretion that federal legislation gives prosecutors, their lack of accountability to local communities, 
and their distinctly careerist prosecution of prominent defendants). 
136 See generally Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10 PEPP. 
L. REV. 321 (1983) (the federal anti-corruption regime exists largely without constraint in its application to local 
corruption). See also Brown, supra note 35. 
137 It would, in principle, be easy enough to modify the statutes discussed supra note 19 to establish different 
standards for officials, though it would require care in the drafting process. 
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through elections), and the crisis of national identity, using a civic mold to demand higher 
standards from the powerholders in government appears worthy of at least serious consideration. 
3. Practical solutions: state-federal cooperation 
If the Court is as firmly committed to defending agonist democracy as McDonnell 
suggests, alternatives that do not require a change in the law are worthy of consideration. State 
(and local) anti-corruption law designed along civic lines may offer a more promising 
possibility.
138
 Such laws could adopt the broad drafting and flexible enforcement necessary to 
robustly encourage public-mindedness, with the additional benefit of greater intimacy between 
state government and their smaller, geographically compact constituencies. While there would be 
variance between state laws, this would reflect local norms and enable ‘laboratories of 
democracy.’
139
 As the Court’s suspicion of a robust federal anti-corruption regime is motivated 
in part by federalism concerns, state-led enforcement of a broad, civic-minded anti-corruption 
regime might receive more sympathetic treatment. 
Such a solution has its own challenges, many of which are political rather than doctrinal. 
State governments may lack the political will to police their own affairs, especially if corruption 
occurs at high level in the state government. Prosecutors may fear political repercussions 
bringing prosecutions against high-ranking officials, particularly where the legality of conduct is 
ambiguous, and the smaller scale of state politics may make it harder for momentum to develop 
in marginal test-the-law cases. Likewise, an outsized political personality or powerful clique in a 
state executive may be more capable of controlling the enforcement apparatus, thereby 
                                                 
138 Cf. George Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? -- Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 225, 299 (1997) (arguing state anti-corruption laws should be used to inform federal anti-
corruption enforcement). 
139 For a succinct review of this, and other benefits of state independence, see generally Jessica Bulman-Posen and 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1261 (2016). 
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preventing or derailing anti-corruption prosecutions. More generally, monitoring corruption can 
be a costly endeavor which state agencies may not have the resources to undertake.
140
 
State-federal cooperation might provide a partial solution.
141
 Federal resources could 
defray the costs of anti-corruption enforcement by state agencies, either by cooperation or by 
allowing the federal government to perform certain aspects of anti-corruption monitoring, but 
prosecutions could be left to the state. Such an approach would pose its own challenges – in 
particular it would not firmly alleviate questions regarding lack of political will of states to self-
police
142
 – but it offers greater respect for federalism. Thus such an approach has a higher 
likelihood of surviving judicial scrutiny, allows for the expression of local political norms, and 
creates conditions that might encourage public-minded anti-corruption. In particular, if the form 
of the federal intervention included an element that publicized questionable conduct, it could 
both facilitate populist action (likely through elections), and provide political stimulus for state 
enforcement. Of course, such a regime would involve significant logistical challenges and 
require novel forms of cooperation between state and federal entities, but it may offer the firmest 
mechanism for implementing civic-minded anti-corruption while accommodating the Court’s 
view of federal anti-corruption. Moreover, by emphasizing federal resources in the first instance 
as a mechanism for disclosure (both to state agencies, and to the public if necessary), such an 
                                                 
140 See generally James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from the 
American States, 30 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 306 (2014) (describing systemic factors that may prevent anti-corruption 
enforcement). 
141 For some sympathetic proposals, see generally Renee M. Landers, Federalization of State Law: Enhancing 
Opportunities for Three-Branch and Federal-State Cooperation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 811 (1995); for a discussion of 
the benefits risks of such an approach, see Lisa L. Miller and James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal 
Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239 (2005). 
142 Some might see this allocation of responsibility to the states as a virtue. See generally Jessica Pulman-Bozen, 
Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2014) (arguing there are benefits to states pushing back against 
federal domination of governance). 
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approach would potentially accord with the sympathy most justices have expressed to disclosure 




 McDonnell rules on only a single point of anti-corruption blackletter doctrine,
144
 and the 
Court’s underlying normative theory of politics comprises only rather casually advanced dicta. 
Yet these dicta provide a foundation for organizing the modern official corruption jurisprudence, 
and, as a signpost of the Court’s posture on appropriate political behavior, provides a seminal 
perspective the law of substantive politics. As with the infamous footnote 4 of Carolene 
Products,
145
 McDonnell’s discussion of representation is most noteworthy as a signal of how the 
Court might be expected to intervene in politics more generally. The opinion’s approbation of 
reciprocity and patronage reveals the Court’s underlying democratic theory, and conceptually 
organizes the official corruption jurisprudence. As the official corruption jurisprudence has of 
late produced consensus opinions (unlike most law on substantive politics, which is the subject 
of fierce partisan dispute), it is an especially useful indicator of the judicial perception of politics. 
 This article has primarily addressed the structural implications of the Court’s position, 
demonstrating that the Court’s substantive politics will place a great onus on voters to assess 
political behavior, while simultaneously discouraging cooperative political practice. The 
marginalization of civic politics may be the weightiest implication of the Court’s view. While a 
                                                 
143 Albeit, this has occurred in the campaign finance context. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (celebrating 
disclosure measures as enhancing citizen autonomy, particularly in comparison to direct regulation of use of 
money). 
144 See Stephenson, supra note 4. 
145 U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of its outsized significance, see Jack 
M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1988).  
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civic approach to politics is not intrinsically superior to an agonist approach,
146
 it does confer 
benefits
147
 such that the Court’s disapprobation of it is worthy of critical scrutiny. 
The solidarity of the bench in the official corruption jurisprudence might raise doubts 
regarding the efficacy of novel legal arguments to advance a civic approach to politics, at least 
insofar as the goal is success in federal litigation at the highest levels. This unified stance is 
particularly salient in contrast to the various movements in law and cognate social science 
disciplines that have championed civic approaches to politics – expecting or encouraging citizens 
and leaders to, with some level of depth, commit to a form of political life that prioritizes the 
public good.
148
 The Court’s skepticism towards these movements may have been apparent in 
prior cases, but it is McDonnell that makes explicit the Court’s normative commitment to 
preserving agonist political practices, even if such a posture condones grossly self-interested 
behavior. 
 Much of the agitation for broader political reform in American law – whether in the 
campaign finance arena or institutional practices more broadly – is directly touched by the 
Court’s protectiveness of agonist politics. The tension may be most apparent in the campaign 
finance domain, given the civic tone adopted by the liberal justices regarding electoral 
corruption.
149
 However, McDonnell also reveals the gulf between the bench’s view of politics as 
expressed in the official corruption context, and the perceptions of politics advanced by many 
contemporary reformers.   
                                                 
146 See note 75 supra. 
147 For a summary of such benefits, see the discussions of Sunstein and Habermas, note 75 supra. 
148 See note 13 supra for the theoretical developments, such as civic republicanism and deliberative democracy, that 
have advanced this view; see Section III.A.2 supra for its more recent and political manifestation as the critique of 
institutional corruption. 
149 See Section III.A.1. 
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 The Court’s posture on anti-corruption might be revised through reinterpreting the 
relevant blackletter principles to accommodate the uniquely privileged status of officials. 
However, such an approach would require unwinding a significant amount of precedent and 
require attentiveness in the impact upon countervailing defendants’ rights. As the law stands, 
public-minded politics will only be realized by concerted citizen voting to ensure offices are held 
by politicians committed to civic practice. It may be possible to take ancillary legislative efforts 
to facilitate this – for example, imposing more rigorous limitations on revolving-door movement 
to the private sector,
150
 and creative anti-corruption enforcement such as state-federal 
cooperation
151
 – but any general cultural change must first occur in the electorate and only then 
‘pass up’ to officeholders. In short, the Court’s approach makes it difficult to lead from above. 
Such an approach may be unrealistically idealistic, difficult to operationalize, and face the 
collective action difficulties described above, but it is the sole alternative available. 
McDonnell should not be taken as an indication that civic anti-corruption efforts, or more 
general theories of civic politics, should be abandoned. Rather the case should be taken as an 
indication of the need to discipline and adapt such efforts to contemporary law. Such a project 
should reinvigorate civic theory, by requiring rigor and detail to overcome a robustly 
championed alternative view. Likewise, practical efforts to ensure that political leaders are first 
and foremost dedicated to the public good must operate through channels that will survive 
judicial scrutiny. Advancement of a civic approach to politics must either work through the 
electorate itself (a project where at least some on the Court are sympathetic to the civic 
                                                 
150 See Thompson, supra note 27, and Lessig, discussed section III.A.2, for a description of such practices. 
151 See Section III.B.3 supra. 
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approach)
152
, or through creative means that can at least alleviate the Court’s first-order doctrinal 
concerns. 
 
                                                 
152 See supra notes 15 and 102 (describing the affinity of liberal justices, in particular Justice Breyer, for a treatment 
of corruption in the campaign finance context that look essentially civic). 
